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FIND OUT WHAT IT MEANS TO ME: THE POLITICS OF RESPECT AND DIGNITY IN SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
Jeremiah A. Ho 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Often upon crucial events in social history, the intimate association between a climactic 
development of an issue and representational media brings us expressions that wed our desired 
norms with the descriptive truth of such matters.  In the heart-pounding seconds after the release 
of Obergefell v. Hodges,1 which ushered in the realities of marriage equality across the United 
States, the national imagination was suddenly swept into a rapturous state of acknowledging that 
love has just won.2  Typical, would-be Friday morning posts on social media for a late June that 
would have included such things as comical pet videos, selfies at the beach, Instagram food 
postings, sarcastic memes, and inspirational tweets were overshadowed by the appearances of 
rainbow-filtered profile pics that accompanied the hashtag, #LoveWins, underscoring the 
voluminous extent of the viral response to the Supreme Court’s 5-4 ruling.3  Big businesses and 
institutions shortly weighed in on the affair.4  The credit card company, Visa, posted a clever 
banner, “Love. Accepted everywhere,”5 that fit perfectly with its “Everywhere you want to be” 
slogan.6  Department store chain Macy’s tweeted a picture that alluded to its bridal registry along 
with the tag, “From this day forward . . . #loveislove.”7  That Friday evening, rainbow colors lit 
the White House as a presidential acknowledgement of the judiciary’s work in Obergefell.  
Proverbially-speaking, it seemed like everyone and their uncle was coming out to say something 
on the matter rather than forever holding their peace.  But this was all justifiable.  Obergefell was 
probably the wedlock announcement between same-sex relationships and the law on the largest 
altar to date.       
Together, the ruling and ensuing social media reaction conveyed that mainstream 
acceptance of same-sex relationships had reversed decades of negative public sentiments.  
Within the history of American law, the open pursuit of love has been a dangerous thing for 
same-sex couples.  In the bedroom context, consensual sexual conduct was once criminal.8 In the 
marriage and family context prior to Obergefell, the right to wed remained unrecognized by 
institutions, politics, and norms that dominated mainstream ideas about sexual identity, gender, 
                                                 
 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law. 
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
2 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, NY Times (Jun. 26, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0.  
3 Dawn Ennis, Victory at Supreme Court for Marriage, ADVOCATE (Nov. 17, 2015), 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2015/06/25/victory-supreme-court-marriage-equality.  
4 Patrick Kulp, The best reactions by major companies to the historic gay marriage decision, MASHABLE 
(Jun. 26, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/06/26/brands-gay-marriage-legalized/#EiPRQpRhTEqF.  




7 Macy’s, “From this day forward….#loveislove,” Jun. 26, 2015, 7:07 AM, Tweet.  
8 See e.g. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2801130 
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and relationships.9  In this way, the Obergefell moment underscored the recent ongoing transition 
away from unpopular views of same-sex relationships.10  And for an instant in that evening after 
the decision, the broadcast image of the Disneyworld castle in Florida basking in rainbow lights 
seemed to impress upon our collective consciousness of finally an outcome for same-sex couples 
that embodied a happy storybook ending.11  Love, at last, was available and no longer cabined.  
Love had, presumably, won.    
That sentiment of storybook endings was later extended in media representations of 
same-sex couples after Obergefell.  Advertisements kept alive the spirit of #LoveWins in their 
purpose of marketing and selling as summer 2015 moved into the autumn.  One prominent 
example was the Campbell’s Soup television commercial that featured a real-life gay male 
couple in a humorous meal-time scene in their home kitchen with their adopted toddler son.12  
Apart from incorporating this portrayal of the gay fathers, the ad was depicting the same scene of 
comfort that other Campbell’s Soup ads had done before using opposite-sex couples and their 
children.13  The ad begins with a close-up of an opened can of Campbell’s Condensed Soup, 
resting on a kitchen counter near a stove.14  The can bears a picture of the Star Wars character 
Darth Vader to signify Campbell’s marketing of the next Star Wars movie.15  As we hear a man’s 
voice singing the Imperial March (Darth Vader’s Theme) from Star Wars, the ad cuts away from 
the stove and follows the singing to show a father entertaining his son in the same kitchen during 
mealtime.16  “Cooper, I am your father,” says the man, imitating Darth Vader while playfully 
attempting to spoon soup past his son’s lips.17  Suddenly the voice of another man is heard as the 
camera cuts to a wider shot to show that the scene only not includes one father, but two.18  “No, 
no, no, I am your father,” said the second man as he, like the first father imitates Darth Vader 
and also feeds the son a spoonful of soup.19  Then the two men look amusingly at each other 
while the toddler obliviously reaches a hand into the bowl of soup in front of him.20  As the scene 
fades quickly, we can hear one father say to the other, “That’s got to be the worst Vader ever.”21    
The moment is meant to invite us to pause amusingly before the scene fades to the Campbell’s 
logo and a female voiceover announces, “Campbell’s Star Wars Soups, made for real real life,” 
and thus reminding us that this is a Campbell’s Soup commercial after all.22  It leaves us 
                                                 
9 See generally Molly Ball, How Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 1, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-politics-activism/397052/.  
10 Pew Research Center, Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/07/29/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/. 
11 Lucas Grindley, More Than A Dozen Landmarks You Won’t Believe Were Turned Rainbow, ADVOCATE 
(Jun. 27, 2015), http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2015/06/27/more-dozen-landmarks-you-wont-
believe-were-turned-rainbow.  
12 Campbell’s Soup, Your Father (30s)- Campbell’s #RealRealLife, YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rZOMY2sOnE.  
13  See Campbell’s Soup, Mouth- Campbell’s #RealRealLife, YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qxJGWK53D_4.  
14 Your Father, supra note ___.  
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
3 
 
heartened—heartened enough for soup, for all-American Campbell’s Soup, the soup previously 
advertised by Norman Rockwell illustrations,23 the soup of Andy Warhol,24 the soup of round-
faced cartoon children,25 the soup endorsed by one of the largest movie franchises of all time, 
Star Wars, now-produced by Disney.26  By all means, as the ad suggests, same-sex couples and 
their children have been ushered (or ladled) into the mainstream.  They have entered the popular 
media and are visible.  They now eat Campbell’s Soup—as if they had not done so before.  They 
are branded for #RealRealLife—so real that they had to name it twice.27   
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy based his fundamental rights ruling on a determination 
that animus-fueled bans on marriage violated the dignity of same-sex couples particularly in four 
significant discriminatory ways.28  Once Obergefell settled the question of same-sex marriage, 
same-sex couples would, according to the intent behind Kennedy’s opinion, be given the option 
that hopefully dignifies them on equal footing with opposite-sex couples and their children.  
They would be free and autonomous in matrimonial decision-making.29  They would engage in a 
right to an institution dignified by society.30  They would raise children within the same social 
and legal connotations of family as legally-married opposite-sex couples.31  They would partake 
in an institutional social order categorized by law and highly regarded in the heart and 
consciousness of American society.32  In Obergefell, these four changes normatively characterize 
the access to equal dignity that the extension of marriage accorded same-sex couples.33  
Curiously, the Campbell Soup ad could be read in parallel with Kennedy’s goals.  The scenario 
of the ad captures the two men after they have chosen marriage.  They are in the kitchen in a 
meal-time moment that symbolizes mainstream childrearing—albeit rearing on all-American 
processed food.  In this way, they are no longer a gay male couple unable to marry or hindered 
by the law in raising children, nor are they an unmarried, childless gay couple.   Instead, the 
couple is nationally depicted in a scene in which they are in their own perfectly-lit kitchen, 
feeding their child in the same playful, humorous dignified manner that we would expect an 
idealized opposite-sex couple from a nuclear family to be doing as well in their fictionalized 
kitchen in television adland.  There is certainly a sense of dignity and normalcy being 
appropriated and realized in this representation.  Yet, like extending the fundamental right to 
                                                 
23  See generally Campbell’s, SATURDAY EVENING POST (Dec. 24, 1932), 
http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2012/12/07/art-entertainment/beyond-the-canvas-art-entertainment/old-
christmas-ads.html/attachment/campbells.  
24  See generally Blake Gopnik, 32 Short Thoughts About Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Can Paintings 
at MoMA, ARTNET NEWS (Oct. 9, 2015), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/andy-warhols-campbells-soup-can-
paintings-at-moma-338874. 
25 See generally Celebrate National Soup Month with Campbell’s Soup, MODERN GRAPHIC HISTORY 
LIBRARY, WASHINGTON UNIV. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://library.wustl.edu/celebrate-national-soup-month-with-
campbells-soup/.  
26 Scott Mendelson, ‘Star Wars’ Is Hollywoods’s Biggest, Most Enduring Original Franchise, Forbes (Apr. 
17, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottmendelson/2015/04/17/star-wars-is-hollywoods-biggest-original-
franchise/#1328901150cd.  
27 Your Father, supra note ___. 
28 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615.  
29 Id. at 2599.  
30 Id. at 2600.  
31 Id. at 2637.  
32 Id. at 2638.  




marriage to same-sex couples, bestowing that dignity to same-sex relationships creates both a 
hierarchical relationship between sexual minorities and the mainstream, and a moment for the 
mainstream—like the Campbell’s Soup ad—to comment on the respectability of choices same-
sex couples are making in seeking marriage.      
In this way, the descriptive truth about sexual minorities does not end at a rainbow-lit 
Disneyworld castle—or at the kitchen table with a bowl of Campbell’s Soup.   The question of 
sexual identity and American law remains unsettled.  In the figurative dinner party that is the 
history of gay rights, sexual minorities have been welcomed through the door and inside the 
house, been served cocktails and have nibbled on hors d’oeuvres, been seated at the dinner table 
and been asked to unfold the napkins.  But they have only arrived at soup; there is still the rest of 
the meal to be had.  While the right to marriage extends to same-sex couples, sexual minorities 
still face employment and housing discrimination.34  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
has no direct protection of individuals against discrimination based on sexual orientation.35  
ENDA has not been passed.36  The issue of heightened suspect classification of sexual identity 
slipped through Justice Kennedy’s equal protection analysis in Obergefell and remains 
unresolved on the federal level in any meaningful way.37 In addition, despite love winning, there 
was still vociferous opposition to Obergefell.  The difficulty of same-sex couples in obtaining 
marriage licenses—as demonstrated by Kim Davis in Kentucky and others—excerpted some of 
this lingering negativity.38  The religious and conservative outcries after Obergefell are another.39  
The refusal to provide services to same-sex couples by small business owners further 
demonstrates opposition.40  And within the Obergefell ruling itself, four Justices penned dissents 
against the majority.41  Obergefell solidified the narrative of discrimination of same-sex couples 
in marriage.  But as same-sex relationships get the kind of notoriety that they deserve, in what 
ways was sexual orientation anti-discrimination helped by Obergefell?  Love won, but did gay 
win? 
This Article begins with the limits of Obergefell.  It has been evident that within the last 
century, dignity has been used to leverage advancements against human rights violations and 
restrictions within the law.42  Dignity has been a means to an end; its post-Enlightenment, 
fundamental universality supplanted previous versions of humanity and has been regarded as a 
                                                 
34 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625-26.  
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 
36 Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of ENDA after Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH. POST 
(July 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-withdrawing-
support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-decision/.  
37 Matthew Hoffman, Obergefell Ruling Strengthens Case for Treating Sexual Orientation as Suspect 
Classification, CASETEXT (Jun. 26, 2015), https://casetext.com/posts/obergefell-ruling-strengthens-case-for-treating-
sexual-orientation-as-suspect-classification.  
38 John Mura & Richard Perez-Pena, Marriage Licenses Issues in Kentucky County, but Debate Continue, 
NY TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0.  
39 Sherif Girgis, After Obergefell: The Effects on Law, Culture, and Religion, CATHOLIC WORLD REPORT 
(Jun. 29, 2015), 
http://www.catholicworldreport.com/Item/3991/after_iobergefelli_the_effects_on_law_culture_and_religion.aspx.  
40 Rudi Keller, Hawley Seeks Exemption for Churches, Businesses to Refuse Same-sex Couples, COLUM. 
TRIB. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/politics/hawley-seeks-exemptions-for-churches-
businesses-to-refuse-same-sex/article_fa7b74e3-a24f-5bea-922c-f339eb6bd88a.html.  
41 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2588.  
42 Erin Daly, DIGNITY RIGHTS 1 (2013).  
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normative individual entitlement.43  Even before Obergefell, the anti-gay rhetoric that stole 
dignity away from sexual minorities for decades was a way in which the denial of their civil 
rights was justifiable under the law.  As others have recounted, challenges fought in court and 
state legislatures over gay rights in the past were lost by gay litigants and gay rights advocates 
partly because the dominant rhetoric against sexual minorities was couched within the politics 
that disrespected them44—that, for instance, gays were living in a lifestyle premised on a 
morally-blameworthy choice or pathology, and that they practiced sexually-deviant, perverse 
acts.45    
For the most part, we have moved further away from a politics of disrespect toward 
recognizing that dignity exists in sexual preferences.46  So a good question to ask in the recent 
shadow of Obergefell is whether the dignity recognized by the Court specifically accorded 
sexual minorities the respect that they should be entitled to for being who they are or whether the 
dignity rhetoric in Obergefell stopped short of this view and settled for addressing the 
respectability of choices of same-sex couples for wanting to participate in marriage.  Obergefell 
was an opinion about dignity as respectability.47  So how does it impact the way in which sexual 
minorities move further to resolve questions of sexual identity and the law, if “further” means 
anti-discrimination?   
This leap from respectability to respect is this Article’s inquiry.  If we need to move to 
further anti-discrimination for sexual orientation on the federal level, then we must arrive at a 
situation where dignity under the law is the acknowledgment of respect for sexual identities, not 
of the respectability of choices made by those who are sexual minorities.  As the lyrics sung so 
famously by Aretha Franklin in a song known for its symbolic impact on 1960’s gender equality, 
particularly for its “appeal for dignity,” suggests, respect is an important human regard that is 
often withheld:  “All I’m askin’ / Is for a little respect when you come home.”48  Beyond this 
Part I introduction, Part II of this Article will discuss the impact of respectability in gay rights 
advocacy and observe dignity defined by respect politics as a normative goal.  Part III will then 
explore how the discussion about dignity in the context of gay rights at the Court was also 
simultaneously a journey from the politics of disrespect to currently the politics of respectability.  
And Part IV will theorize how the narrative of sexual orientation anti-discrimination can proceed 
from dignity as respectability to dignity as respect, before Part V’s conclusion.   
                                                 
43 See id. at 2-3.   
44 See e.g. Martha C. Nussbaum, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  77-85(2010) (observing Bowers v. Hardwick exemplifed how “[y]ears of stigmatization of 
gays and lesbians made it all to easy for judges . . . to talk about them as a class of moral pariahs who are not like 
other humans”).  
45 Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 Va. L. Rev. 
817, 835 (2014). 
46 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private 
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime.”). 
47 Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 Cal. L. Rev. Online 117 (2015).  
48 Aretha Franklin, Respect (Rhino Records 1967); see also Mark Ribowsky, DREAMS TO REMEMBER: OTIS 
REDDING, STAX RECORDS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN SOUL (2015) (quoting Rolling Stones 
interview with Jerry Wexler, producer of Aretha Franklin’s recording of “Respect” on the song’s significance). 
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 As we progress (hopefully) toward anti-discrimination for sexual minorities, respect 
certainly seems like the more desirable route to take when it comes to using dignity to elevate the 
status of sexual minorities to a protected class—whether judicially or legislatively.  Dignity as 
respect reframes the discussion away from choices and existence in a way that deprives the 
dominant culture opportunities to comment, and instead, places the subgroup in a light where 
such type of judgment is off the table.           
II. DIGNITY AS RESPECT 
A. DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
Although no consistency exists within the vast usage and interpretations of human dignity 
by political institutions and courts internationally, a generalized accord does exist in tracing the 
history of dignity’s import into the modern legal and political sphere.49  Current political 
incarnations of dignity took shape briefly post-World War II in human rights movements and 
discourse, in which dignity was a currency of value because its connections with intrinsic 
humanity and worth addressed the inhumane atrocities of Nazi Europe.50  Such use of dignity 
toward preserving human rights prompted examples of post-war declarations proclaiming the 
recognition and protection of dignity as, in some ways, a right to humanity in various 
contexts51—despite much ultimate debate over the definite and tangible contours of that right.52  
With drafting influence from Jacques Maritian, the prominent French Catholic philosopher, the 
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights both placed human 
dignity at the forefront with proclamations that mentioned respectively the “dignity and worth of 
the human person”53 and “recognition of the inherent dignity . . . of all members of the human 
family” in their texts.54  This acknowledgment and import of human dignity functions as the 
underlying cohesive force or value for the idealized furtherance of human rights efforts stated in 
the Universal Declaration.55  Other international documents ensued, including by example the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides in Article 10 that “[a]all 
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with the humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person.”56  The 1977 additions to Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, dealing with captivity of non-combatants and combatants who are 
prisoners of war, similarly uphold human dignity during armed conflict by dictating that those 
held captive “shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,”57 and explicitly prohibiting 
“outrages toward personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”58       
                                                 
49 DIGNITY RIGHTS, supra note __, at 5.   
50 Christopher  McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 European J. 
Int’l L. 662-63 (2008). 
51 Id. at 670-71. 
52 Id. at 673-75. 
53 Preamble; U.N. CHARTER, art. 1. 
54 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A at 71,  U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pmbl, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948). 
55 See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1153, 1172 (1998). 
56 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 10. 
57 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 




  Of course, the concept itself of human dignity predates modernity.  Scholarly work in 
legal and political philosophy on human dignity often cite to examples in antiquity.  Both 
Christopher McCrudden and Rex Glensy in their respective studies on human dignity trace the 
concept at least to the classical Roman period where dignity had two meanings—first, as an idea 
of honor and respect accorded to one holding a particular status (“dignitas homini”); and 
secondly, as an idea, attributed to Cicero, of dignity as an inherent quality based on human 
existence (“dignitas”).59 The survival and evolution of the concept of human dignity through the 
ages is beyond this Article’s inquiry but needless to say, human dignity was not an idea about 
human existence that was conceived in the mid-twentieth century but rather developed 
throughout the periods of Western thought.60   The two competing ideas of dignity—one that 
would embrace status and hierarchy and another that embraced intrinsic universal worth—would 
play out their dominance and prevalence over the centuries.  We see this modernly in plain-
meaning word studies when scholars run the word “dignity” through dictionaries and come up 
with both meanings.61   
But as exhibited from the international documents above, the concept of dignity as the 
respect for intrinsic worth or inherent humanity seems to have prevailed in modern political and 
legal frameworks.  Nobility connotations of the dignity from antiquity, as well as the later 
medieval and pre-modern religious association of dignity that place the Divine as the source of 
intrinsic human worth, are both constrained in the modern political concepts of dignity.62  Now 
devoid of its religious and feudal connotations, dignity was no longer a condition or status that 
was earned through rank or transformation, but an inherent secular quality as a result of having 
an existence that translated into an entitlement to be recognized by political institutions and 
under legal frameworks.  Immanuel Kant, who is often credited with laying the modern 
foundation of dignity, certainly took the side of dignity as respect for inherent worth from a more 
objective posture, putting aside religious or noble influences.63  Kant’s categorical imperative 
demonstratives that intrinsic worth:  “Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used 
merely as a means by any man (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at 
the same time as an end.”64  Beneath Kant’s surface proclamation that one should not treat 
people as a means but rather as ends, other implications arise.  Tethered to the intrinsic worth in 
every human being is the notion that “dignity is grounded in a concept of autonomy that holds at 
its core a valued moral center that is equal for everyone (men and women).”65  Undoubtedly 
within a Kantian text, variation in opinions exists in scholarly explication and interpretation 
                                                 
59 McCrudden, supra note ___, at 656-57; Red D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 Colum. Human. Rights 
L. Rev., 65, 73 (2011). 
60 Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the 
Transnational Discourse , 35 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 331, 334 (2012). 
61 See e.g. Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 223, 224 (1998) (finding that the American Heritage dictionary contain both definitions of dignity 
as “self-respect” and also of “nobility.”); see also Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 795, 854 n. 145 (2001) (finding that the word “dignity” in Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary of the English Language possessed a primary definition of dignity as “intrinsic worth” and secondary 
meaning as “degree of esteem”).  
62 Glensy, supra note __, at 74. 
63 Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 669, 678 (2005)  
64 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals (ak 6:462). 
65 Glensy, supra note __, at 76. 
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regarding Kant’s vision of dignity.66  However, “whether rightly or wrongly, the conception of 
dignity most closely associated with Kant is the idea of dignity as autonomy, that is the idea that 
to treat people with dignity is to treat them as autonomous individuals able to choose their 
destiny.”67  Derived from this philosophy, “[t]he legal application of Kantian thought is to use, as 
a baseline, the notion that individuals should always be protected from any instrumentalization 
by the state.”68   From here, the distance seems short between the Kantian concept of dignity 
with its universalist regard for a person’s inherent humanity and any politically egalitarian 
approaches to individual rights; and indeed Kant’s idea of dignity has contributed to the 
development of equality in Western thought.69   That bridge is accomplished through the 
derivative relationship between human dignity and individual autonomy as its proxy.  As Jeremy 
Rabkin has observed,   
Kant certainly linked “human dignity” with equality. He grounded the claim of 
human dignity in human free will, in the capacity for moral choice. According to 
Kant this capacity is the same, in principle, in the most degraded and the most 
exalted of human beings. Kant made the claim to “autonomy” a central aspect of 
human dignity—the notion that each person makes his own moral law for his own 
life.70 
A close relationship between a Kantian version of dignity and equality is plausible because 
between the two original core definitions of dignity—either dignitas hominis or dignitas—and 
their respective derivations, Kant’s concept of dignity like embraces the latter (dignitas) by 
justifying an egalitarian approach to humanity over a hierarchical one.  We see this import into 
the post-World War II era with acknowledgements of equal rights based on regard for human 
dignity through the intrinsic worth of individual existence.71  In particular, the proclivities of 
Kantian and neo-Kantian concepts of dignity for animating notions of equality within the modern 
era makes adopting human dignity attractive—and almost necessary—in human rights 
discourse.72  Henceforth, it is no wonder that dignity appears frequently in modern human rights 
documents internationally.  
B.  DIGNITY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
Kant’s influence in American political conceptions of dignity is somewhat qualified by 
the appearance and usage of the word “dignity” by some of the founding personalities of the 
early United States.  Glensy notes that Thomas Paine’s use of “natural dignity of man,” which 
stressed inherent worth consistently with Kant’s version of dignity, called out to individual rights 
protection that countered the British definition “where dignity had more of an ancient Roman 
connotation and was reserved for the nobility or aristocracy”73 and that Paine’s view was shared 
                                                 
66 McCrudden , supra note __, at  659.  
67 Id. at 659-60 
68 Glensy, supra note __, at 76. 
69 The Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Search for Equality: A Human Rights Issue, 25 Queen’s 
L.J. 401, 405 (2000).  
70 Jeremy Rabkin, What We Can Learn About Human Dignity from International Law, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 145, 147 (2003). 
71 John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 539, 561 (2006). 
72 See id. 
73 Glensy, supra note __, at 77. 
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by Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton.74  Yet, the definition of dignity as respect for 
inherent humanity faced competing tension with the meaning of dignity as status or rank, not 
merely with British oppressors, but also domestically within the founding philosophy of the new 
American republic.  The competition between the two meanings of dignity reverberated through 
The Federalist Papers, as Glensy observes, as the idea of dignity “seems initially to have a 
central position” but “[f]ollowing the Kantian usage of the term, the concept of dignity in The 
Federalist Papers then morphs into the ancient Roman connotation.”75  Eventually, “dignity as 
an inherent quality of individuals was lost to a view of dignity as an attribute acquired as a result 
of holding an official position.”76  Of course, the other marked feature in regards to American 
political precepts and the use of dignity is the lack of the invocation of “dignity” in most of the 
founding documents.  Other than its wavering usage in The Federalist Papers, the word 
“dignity” itself is not to be found in the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, or 
the Bill of Rights.77  In searching for dignitary rights within our founding texts, the word play of 
course can become a tug-of-war between textual exegetes and more hermeneutical readers.78  For 
now, it seems as if the hermeneutical readers have won and that curious lack of “dignity” in our 
founding documents has not proved fatal to dignity’s conceptualization, presence, and influence 
within American law.  Perhaps in the U.S., what we have is merely a case where we adhere to 
invoking spirit of dignity rather than to its letter—and indeed, this seems to be have occurred in 
the interpretation of the Constitution at least.  For instance, absent positive declarations of 
dignity rights in governing legal texts in the U.S., the concept that individuals possess human 
dignity is often established within the sphere of negative rights, in the adjudication of state 
interference with freedoms that not only are fundamental under due process theories but 
considered as proxies that externalize human dignity.79  Likely here dignity’s emergence reflects 
the synergies of individual rights theory and American libertarian leanings.  The approach to 
dignity in the U.S. has been observed as “more individualistic” than communitarian approaches 
such as in Germany where “dignity” is a pronounced right under its constitution and embodies a 
definition of respect for self-worth but one that is concurrently located within the community.80  
Dignity is alive and present in American jurisprudence.    
Undeniably, dignity is a word found within U.S. constitutional parlance because “[a]t 
least as dignity pertains to the Constitution, the Supreme Court has, albeit scantily, developed 
certain narratives based on human dignity as it pertains to certain constitutional rights.”81  
Maxine Goodman has traced the Supreme Court’s usage into eight narratives (or categories) 
spanning across amendments that touch upon individual rights.82  Of the eight, two narratives 
encompass 14th amendment due process and equal protection theories where dignity has helped 
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address rights interference that would have otherwise furthered minority discrimination based on 
hierarchical differentiations.  First, one of the identified narratives where the presence of dignity 
interests appears is in the negative rights cases involving privacy, in which dignity is the 
underlying reason for allowing individuals to have autonomy in personal choices that affect self-
identity in some way (individuality and personhood).83  In Part III, we see this narrative line lead 
to the decriminalizing of consensual same-sex sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.84  The other 
narrative dealt with the use of equal protection in education and accommodation cases where 
dignity interests of litigants helped the Court address racial discrimination in Brown v. Board of 
Education,85 and racial and gender discrimination in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S.86 and 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees.87  In these cases, Goodman notes that dignity interests seem to strike at 
inherent worth and humanity.  Indeed, in handling cases that involve human dignity interests, the 
Court appears generally to side with Kant:  “[I]t is the Kantian vision of dignity that seemingly 
animates those Justices who find that certain constitutional clauses incorporate the concept of 
human dignity.  In other words, it is a person’s inherent autonomy, integrity, and right to be 
respected by the government that motivates references to dignity by the Supreme Court.”88  
Thus, with cases involving discrimination, the invocation of dignity at Supreme Court, which 
applies a more Kantian approach toward dignity, has been an important part of addressing 
minority rights to equality and to overcoming hierarchy and exclusion. 
Broadly-speaking, the idea of respect in dignity has been carved out and then manifested 
as an equal recognition of human existence in all individuals and the rights that attach to 
existence.  In the 14th amendment substantive due process cases Goodman mentions, the Court’s 
regard for autonomy in privacy seem to suggest recognition of rights to exist because autonomy 
reflects personhood.  So long as personhood serves as an agent of that humanity, this is 
consistent with philosophies of dignity that stress that dignity requires some sort of respect of 
inherent humanity.  Likewise, in the equal protection cases that Goodman observes, the Court’s 
analysis in segregation and discrimination cases goes to the stigma and injury that such acts 
inflict on individuals based on aspects of the inherent humanity, which the Court sees in their 
racial and gender identities.89  From a negative rights perspective in U.S. constitutional law, 
because of the respect for the dignity of individuals, such equal recognition either in existence 
(i.e. identity) or fundamental rights that derive from personal autonomy should not be taken 
away or abridged without a methodical calculation or concern.  This is the framework within 
equality jurisprudence and due process.  On larger cosmic levels of politics, this is the 
framework against wholesale tyranny.  Thus, respect for inherent humanity is a constitutional 
virtue and an aspect within human dignity that normatively ought to be preserved.     
C. DIGNITY IN U.S. GAY RIGHTS ADVANCEMENT 
 Without explicit anti-discrimination protections, such as a delineation under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 or a heightened scrutiny classification under equal protection, sexual 
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minorities have had to rely on the Supreme Court to articulate their violated dignity in order to 
protect themselves from marginalization based on sexual orientation or identity.  By no means, 
has dignity been the only strategy of success.  With some slight subtextual allusions to dignity, 
Romer v. Evans90 relied mostly on the presence of majoritarian animus behind the voter passage 
of a state referendum in Colorado that would have singled out sexual minorities.91  The Supreme 
Court’s explicit use of dignity to address discrimination based on sexual orientation was first 
witnessed in Lawrence, where Justice Kennedy crafted a ruling that mentioned the dignity of 
consensual same-sex partners in order to overturn prior precedent condoning anti-sodomy 
statutes in Bowers v. Hardwick.92   Through the privacy interests in the reproductive rights cases, 
the Court exhibited its regard for individual autonomy central to dignity and extended that 
privacy context to also include consensual same-sex intimacy.93  From there, the Court noted 
how sexual conduct had autonomy implications that tied itself—similarly to privacy cases—to 
the respect for personhood and human worth requisite for the function of dignity overall.  By 
consequence, privacy was extended from reproductive rights to sexual conduct in Lawrence in 
order to decriminalize consensual same-sex sodomy.94  This result was significant as Lawrence 
served as a moment in which “the Court advanc[ed] human dignity as part of affording liberty”95 
and invariably “marks a more substantial shift” in use of dignity in privacy cases.96       
Arguments have been made that at the broader reaches of Lawrence, the case was not just 
about consensual same-sex intimacy, but rather the sexual acts of willing same-sex partners 
served as proxy in context for sexual orientation and identity because the choices made in 
consensual same-sex intimacy revealed sexual preferences:  
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each 
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The 
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean 
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full 
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. “It is a 
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter.” The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest 
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.97 
In some ways, as Glensy points out, dignity here served as a heuristic of something else:  “Under 
the proxy approach to the right to dignity, the invocation of a dignitary interest in a particular 
circumstance does not signify something independent of another enumerated right, but rather 
acts as a proxy for that right (be that right related to a liberty or an equality interest for 
example).”98 As he notes in this vein with Lawrence, “the Court held ‘that adults may choose to 
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enter upon this relationship in the confines of their home and their private lives and still retain 
their dignity as free persons.’ “99 Post-Lawrence, some scholarly inquiry in regards to the 
Kennedy’s use of dignity in the sodomy case and connections to a possible insinuation of the 
immutability of sexual identity have also buttressed this notion that dignity can act as a 
channeling function for the Court to solve a problem that has no straightforward doctrinal fix by 
being the placeholder for sexual identity.100  If dignity is a respect for inherent humanity, sexual 
identity would seemingly fit within Kantian notions of autonomy and personhood.  This inherent 
humanity—and by extension, dignity—could conceivably serve as the placeholder for inherent 
or innate sexual identity (whether biological or constructive) before a real judicial discussion of 
it is ripe while making it also possible for a subtle and favorable reading of immutability in the 
subtext of Kennedy’s opinion.  In this way, dignity, according to Glensy’s reading of Lawrence, 
bridged the gap in the conversation between sexual identity and sexual conduct:  “Such coupling 
of privacy and dignity within the context of liberty strongly suggests if not an identity between 
the two, then at least a very strong correlation that is sufficiently bonded to discourage separate 
discussion of the two.”101   And all of these transitive properties and connections made through 
dignity make sense to justify Lawrence because the Court could not have relied readily on any 
doctrine that would have protected against discrimination based on sexual orientation.  The Court 
had to resort to something else: dignity.      
 Interpreting Lawrence’s incantation of dignity, Kenji Yoshino has identified the origins 
of an “anti-humiliation principle” in gay rights.102  This attachment of dignity to the context of 
gay rights is significant and conducive for sexual minority litigants because it counters prior 
social sentiments regarding sexual minorities from what Yoshino calls, “a politics of shame.”103  
Dignity facilitates litigation, as well as development of doctrine.   At least in Lawrence, it helped 
recognize the autonomy in conduct that could possibly express sexual identity but also the 
inherent humanity of that sexual identity.  After Lawrence, the potency of dignity has served gay 
rights well.  Beyond the decriminalization of consensual sex acts of same-sex partners, dignity 
interests were noted in the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,104 in the overturning of DOMA in 
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U.S. v. Windsor,105 and finally with marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges.106  That anti-
humiliation principle seems to have immense utility.  In addition, the use of dignity in the 
Supreme Court’s gay rights opinions has been consistent in keeping with ideas of inherent 
human worth that justifies, by proxy, anti-discriminatory ends.  By invoking ideas of autonomy 
and personhood, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell all tried to tap into that association in some 
varying degrees.  Sexual orientation would invariably be linked to that personhood and thus 
respect for minority sexual orientations would fulfill dignity interests.   
 But because dignity lacks a positivist incantation in American law and is define and 
shaped predominately in negative rights, an amorphous wavering exists in its meaning and it 
does not go unnoticed.  Sometimes that seemingly age-old tension between respect and rank 
continues to play out in constitutional cases and the Court’s recent pro-gay rights opinions 
exhibit this competition.  However, in the case of defining dignity by rank or nobility status, in 
which dignity is earned and accorded, dignity by rank or nobility has been replaced with 
evaluations of the social respectability of sexual minorities that, upon a favorable appraisal, 
confer dignity and lead to recognition of relationships (such as in Windsor) or to the extension of 
the right to marry (Obergefell).  For sexual minorities, a subgroup that has been steeped within 
the politics of marginalization, the significance of attaining respect within the collective social 
terrain cannot be overstated.  Respect could be toward many things from the significant to the 
mundane—e.g. personal choices, images, lifestyles, tastes, what to post on social media, what 
wine to drink on a Friday night—that could consequently place sexual minorities in the realm 
beyond historical reproach, judgment, and bias to somewhere closer to social acceptance.  
Respect would also ideally recognize, in the neo-Kantian sense, the inherent that distinguishes 
sexual minorities—i.e. their distinct sexual preference—and view that attribute and expression of 
orientation not as an aberration but as a welcomed and contributing part of pluralism, and so by 
extension human existence.  The question, however, is whether that respect is an entitlement, of 
the type reflected by the meaning of dignity as respect, or whether it must be negotiated and then 
earned, which is more like dignity through rank or nobility.  This debate has not been a recent 
one in gay rights, nor has it been exclusively within sexuality rights discourse.  The rise and use 
of dignity in the advancement of gay rights and possibly toward future advances in sexual 
orientation anti-discrimination warrants a continuing discussion.          
 In the post-Obergefell world, where one of the next steps for gay rights advancement is 
anti-discrimination, respect for inherent humanity would seem to comport with that goal.  In this 
way, dignity rights must continue to further gay rights and anti-discrimination, serving as the 
channeling device or the heuristic but also the agent that facilitates respect for minority sexual 
orientations and identities.  Here is where that tension between dignity as respect and dignity as 
respectability becomes an issue.  Although Lawrence ultimately bolstered respect for autonomy 
and personhood in its definition of dignity, even there the opinion exhibited a bit of ambiguity in 
viewing consensual same-sex intimacy.  Yuvraj Joshi, in his careful study of respectability and 
dignity in Obergefell, has noted that Lawrence tended “to affirm dignity as respect for freedom 
to make personal choices,”107 but Kennedy’s opinion also “did convey a measure of 
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respectability:  Justice Kennedy depicted sexual conduct as ‘but one element of personal bond 
that is more enduring,’ even though John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, who were convicted 
under the impugned Texas statute, were not known to be in a relationship.”108  Part III of this 
Article will demonstrate further how Windsor and Obergefell were cases in which Lawrence’s 
original idea of dignity as respect was subsequently augmented by a politics of respectability that 
has brought both meanings of dignity within the advancement of gay rights.           
 Respectability politics has a negotiating function not just in the realm of minority rights 
discourse, but also in furthering acceptance of a marginalized group into the mainstream.  Our 
paths to dignity can be influenced, for better or worse, by the way different subgroups achieve 
social recognition in a body politic.  In the evolving visibility and acceptance of sexual 
minorities, the historical negotiation for gays has been described as a conversation that tries to 
subvert marginalization by playing into respectable standards held by the dominant perspective:  
“Assimilation in the gay/lesbian community is based on models of respectability and upward 
class mobility that are heterosexually defined.  Heterosexuals control the culture because the 
more different a gay/lesbian is to the heterosexual culture, the less likely it is that s/he will be 
hired to work in the highest paying jobs in our society.”109  To this end, “[g]ays and lesbians who 
‘pass’ have been able to break through these barriers, however, usually the price is costly: 
‘staying in the closet’.”110  Through respectability, the whole negotiation assures hierarchy and 
the subgroup individual trying to gain access starts at the position of the outsider.111  Rather than 
demanding respect for their inherent dignity, there is pressure to exhibit respectability in order 
acquire dignity from a dominant group.112  Granted, dignity is earned through a process in which 
the individual is “dignified” hopefully in the end, but it is inevitably at the expense of 
subjugation.  The politics of respectability might be pragmatic but members of subgroups 
compromise inherent dignity either advertently or inadvertently in order to “trade up” for social 
tolerance and then acceptance by a dominating group.  This is not to say that all minority 
individuals do this involuntarily.  But where pressure exists to gain respectability, the ideals of a 
leveled democratic playing field are thwarted by the persistence of dominant politics and 
hierarchy.  It is a fix in the short run for obtaining social acceptance, but it may inhibit efforts 
toward formal equality in the long run.    
The literature on race has ample examples regarding the competing politics of respect and 
respectability in order to achieve racial equality and acceptance.  Observations and ideas about 
respectability in African-American negotiations against racial bias stem all the way back to 
slavery, for example in examining the caricature of Uncle Tom associated with the stereotypes of 
conformity.  W.E.B. DuBois hinted at this negotiation by articulating a conflicted duality or 
“double consciousness” that is often present in the identities and existence of educated African-
Americans in the early 20th century:  “One ever feels his twoness - an American, a Negro; two 
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose 
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”113  As DuBois noted, the duality 
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permeates the negotiation of African Americans:  “The history of the American Negro is the 
history of this strife – this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into 
a better and truer self.”114  All of this tension is traced to a desire to obtain worth—”to make it 
possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon by 
his fellows, without having the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face.”115 
Evelyn Brooks Higginbottam specifically coined the term “politics of respectability” to 
describe this identity negotiation in African-American churchwomen in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.116  By analogy, the concept could be observed analogously in colonial and post-
colonial discourse.117  Hence, this is not just an American domestic phenomenon.  In the U.S. 
racial context, the discussion over a subgroup’s own cultural negotiations to obtain social 
acceptance has survived into the post-Civil Rights era dialogue about African-American racial 
identity—into the presidency of Barack Obama, for instance118; in the heated debates over the 
efficacious endorsements of respectability by Randall Kennedy119; and race relations discourse 
related to #BlackLivesMatter.120  But issues over respectability do not pertain only to African-
American racial discourse because “to the extent that social acceptability and respectability is 
equated with whiteness, issues of cultural assimilation are issues of ‘race.’ “ 121  Thus such issues 
rear themselves in discourse about other racial subgroups in the U.S.  For instance, in studies on 
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Asian-American experiences with race, the ideas of cultural assimilation and “model minority” 
have classically demonstrated the emergence of respectability politics.  There is a duality as well 
in the experience of Asian American identities negotiating for acceptance by courting with 
respectability.  As Natsu Taylor Saito puts it, the “model minority” is a label that “reflects its 
intent to both subordinate and manipulate. Asians are a ‘minority’—i.e., not settlers—and thus to 
be relegated to a subordinate status within settler society. Simultaneously, however, we are the 
‘model,’ presumably for other ‘minorities.’ “122 But as the label “evokes the imagery of Asians 
as hardworking, economically successful, and anxious to assimilate,”123 what it also does is 
“mask[] the distinct problems faced by particular subgroups,”124 and “send[] the not-so-subtle 
message to Asian Americans that we should be ‘grateful’ not to be at the bottom of settler racial 
hierarchy, reinforcing settler hegemony by creating barriers to our ability to see common patterns 
of subordination.”125   
On sexual orientation and the law, legal scholarship has identified and explored 
respectability politics—most often either in describing its affects or the contextualized ways in 
which sexual minorities obtain social and legal acceptance.126  Much has been said critically 
about the integration, visibility, and acceptance of sexual minorities.  One of the most vivid 
historical accounts of this debate in gay rights was the famous exchange of articles between 
Paula Ettelbrick and Tom Stoddard in the Fall 1989 issue of Out/Look magazine over the 
potential pros and cons of pursuing recognition of same-sex marriages.127  Ettelbrick opposed the 
strategy for gaining equality through same-sex marriage while Stoddard was more responsive 
and hopeful to the idea.  But both attorneys recognized the transformative properties of marriage 
in terms of its respectability.  Ettelbrick noted that  
[t]he growing discussion about the right to marry may be explained in part by this 
need for acceptance.  Those closer to the norm or to power in this country are 
more likely to see marriage as a principle of freedom and equality.  Those who are 
more acceptable to the mainstream because of race, gender, and economic status 
are more likely to want the right to marry.  It is the final acceptance, the ultimate 
affirmation of identity.128  
Stoddard offered a similar take:   
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Given the imprimatur of social and personal approval which marriage provides, it 
is not surprising that some lesbians and gay men among us would look to legal 
marriage for self-affirmation.  After all, those who marriage can be 
instantaneously transformed from “outsiders” to “insiders,” and we have a 
desperate need to become insiders.129  
Ettelbrick ultimately urged a politics of respect as the norm:  “Justice for gay men and lesbians 
will be achieved only when we are accepted and supported in this society despite our differences 
from the dominant culture and the choices we make regarding our relationships.”130  Meanwhile, 
Stoddard had hopes to overcoming respectability, perhaps in order to get to respect:  “[M]arriage 
may be unattractive and even oppressive as it is currently structured and practiced, but enlarging 
the concept to embrace same-sex couples would necessarily transform it into something new.”131  
The importance of the Ettelbrick/Stoddard discussion is one of relevancy in the wake of 
Obergefell.  It reminds us of the progress in the marriage equality movement, hopefully in part 
precipitated by the increased social visibility of sexual minorities and hopefully precipitating, in 
part, to more protection further down the line.  Conversely, the Ettelbrick/Stoddard debate helps 
verify whether the gay rights movement since 1989 has also succumbed to the politics of 
respectability instead of a more wholeheartedly staunch entrenchment in the politics of respect.  
After all, both of them assumed that marriage has been a traditionally heteronormative 
institution.132  And the studies in gay assimilation or respectability have revealed that the 
dominate norms and end up controlling identity negotiations with respectability are those values 
directly reflecting a white, heteronormative, middle-class, and suburban demographic.133  Was 
Ettelbrick more correct than Stoddard?  Or do we need more time to wait and see Stoddard’s 
view?  And if so, should we have make certain to direct the transformation of same-sex 
relationships within the fundamental right to marriage toward the politics of respect?     
Incidentally, this tension between respectability and respect playing out in the ways one 
could interpret that recent Campbell Soup Ad.   On the one hand, the image of the two fathers 
with their adopted son is a celebration of gay visibility—one that, of course, also affixes a sense 
of progressiveness to the Campbell’s brand identity.  On the other hand, there is a slippery slope 
in which it could also be a moment where a national chain is conferring worth and approval of 
gay relationships.  Both interpretations feed into the grand logic, which is this:  if respectability 
is more about choices one makes to be viewed with dignity by adhering to dominant social 
norms, then dignity is less about inherent humanity of an individual and more about the 
negotiations one has to take to become “dignified.”  Respectability subverts intrinsic dignity and 
equal recognition, perpetuating the notion that dignity is not inherent but must be earned from a 
dominant group.  This notion inhibits equality because it creates and sustains hierarchy.  It would 
not—according to most views—be a normative goal for defining a framework for human dignity 
in the law.  Since the vagueness of dignity or differences in interpretations regarding dignity can 
obfuscate or deny the path to true intrinsic worth and value of human existence that effectuates 
equality and liberty, it is no wonder how easily we lose sight of respect in place of respectability.  
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133 See Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality, 14 
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But a politics of respect preserves inherent humanity and appeals to senses of formal equality.  
Henceforth, in moving beyond marriage equality toward sexual orientation anti-discrimination, 
dignity as respect for the sexual identity of individuals with should be stressed, rather than 
dignity as respectability of choices that might represent sexuality.  In this way, sexual identity or 
orientation serves as the proxy for inherent humanity.  Two reasons underlay this preference.   
First, respect is about recognition of intrinsic qualities that reflect human existence, 
including sexual identities and preferences.  Unlike respectability, such recognition is antithetical 
to a concession that is motivated by the desire for approval, but rather stresses entitlement to 
recognition based on basic human worth.  A result in this perspective would be more likely to 
help show the innateness or the immutability of sexual identity as the association would be 
between sexual orientation or identity with inherent humanity.  As Part IV will explore, 
bolstering the immutability of sexual orientation, in turn, would help clarify anti-discrimination 
protections for sexual minorities. The connection to human dignity so long as the concept fosters 
a politics of respect over respectability would help establish the inherency of sexual identity.  
And we will see also in Part IV, dignity as respect for the inherent might be a helpful extension 
that serves to explain away the nature of sexual orientation toward a better understanding of its 
immutability—ultimately further justifying anti-discrimination protections in the law for sexual 
minorities.        
Secondly, dignity as respect offers another approach toward anti-discrimination for 
sexual minorities because the idea of respect itself is in line with anti-discrimination.  As noted 
above in the racial discrimination cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel and Brown, dignity has the 
potential for furthering equality.  But helpful as well is Glensy’s analysis of the Supreme Court 
abortion cases and how construing dignity as respect also furthers anti-discrimination.  In cases 
such as Casey and Carhart, dignity’s anti-discrimination potential appears when the Supreme 
Court connects the right of women to determine their reproductive health and the right to dignity 
by “characteriz[ing] the idea of dignity as respect in the form of governmental non-interference.” 
134  By doing so, the Court “also introduce[d] an element of equal treatment into the mix by 
coining the phrase ‘equal liberty.’ “135 In this way, as Glensy sees it, “dignity also encompasses, 
at least in words, an anti-discrimination component.”136  Most importantly in this area for sexual 
minorities is the association between Lawrence and the Supreme Court abortion cases, which 
Part III will illustrate.  According to Glensy, “[a]bortion rights cases use the concept of dignity in 
a manner that mirrors Lawrence.”137       
 To be sure, respectability might obtain a sense of social acceptance and safety for the 
individual and it might—as we will explore with the Supreme Court’s marriage cases—
pragmatically bring on developments in the short run that benefits same-sex relationships and, by 
extension, sexual minorities.138  But the flaws in respectability politics house larger implications 
for the struggle and advancement of sexual orientation anti-discrimination.   As this Article’s 
next part will show, in the current dialogue of gay rights, despite the achievement of marriage 
equality across the U.S., that conversation has left us at the doorstep of respectability.  The 
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progressive era of gay rights has incrementally moved away from a politics of disrespect that 
held once enormous indignities against sexual minorities.  However, Obergefell is long from the 
type of dignity imbued with the politics of respect that would ultimately have gains for advances 
in sexual orientation anti-discrimination.   
III.  FROM DISRESPECT TO RESPECTABILITY 
 Kees Waadiljk has long articulated that the legal progress for advancing the recognition 
and rights of sexual minorities in various European countries has been animated by a peculiar 
“law of small change” that moves toward significant triumphs in a series of sequences rather 
than a few swift and dramatic turn of events.139  His theory, later furthered by William 
Eskridge140 and Yeval Merin,141 have helped exemplify that the progress to marriage equality in 
U.S. was invariably a journey of incremental changes that leveraged limited successes within one 
gradual move toward equality for same-sex couples.142  In my previous work, I have called this 
“marriage equality incrementalism” and identified the significant points in the U.S. chronology 
toward same-sex marriage on the federal level.143  But if marriage equality amongst all the states 
was just one of such triumphs—albeit a significant one—within a larger movement toward the 
rights of sexual minorities, this larger movement in itself would be punctuated and cabined in its 
own incrementalism for anti-discrimination.  If dignity as respect is a normative goal in the 
advancement of gay rights against discrimination and has, in some capacity, shaped the case law 
regarding sexual minorities, it would be possible to track the development of dignity as respect 
within the major gay rights cases at the Supreme Court as an incremental journey of its own.  
Indeed in this Part III, the progression for calibrating dignity with respect in these cases does 
arise within a shift from the politics of deliberate indignity and disrespect to sexual minorities 
toward according gays a more worthy recognition.  Yet if such conceptualization of dignity is 
normative, the following will show that we have only reached respectability.  We still have 
distances to travail.            
A.  BOWERS AND ROMER:  THE POLITICS OF DISRESPECT 
There is no doubt that Bowers was a decision that singled out sexual minorities by 
intentionally lacking respect for them.  The Georgia anti-sodomy statute at question in Bowers 
was neutral in regards to the biological sex of the individuals committing such acts, criminalizing 
both same-sex or opposite-sex sodomy.144  Yet, from the beginning of Justice White’s majority 
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decision in Bowers, sexual orientation was deliberately an issue.  White referenced Hardwick’s 
admission as a “practicing homosexual”145 and followed that reference with a decision in which 
he justified anti-sodomy laws based on the reasoning that private homosexual conduct was 
against traditional prevailing morality.146  His framing of the issue as to whether there was an 
unenumerated but fundamental right to homosexual sodomy permitted within 14th Amendment 
Due Process was unnecessary.147  In doing so, White narrowed the discussion from a case about 
sodomy to a case about conduct that could be indicative of homosexuality.148       
On the one hand, this narrowing in Bowers singled out sexual minorities, but on the other 
hand, it also displaced sexual minorities and prevented them from receiving dignified 
mainstream recognition.  Both perspectives are significant for disrespect because the result is that 
their sex and intimacy do not deserve legal protection and in fact should remain criminalized.  
First, Bowers’ use and description of “homosexual sodomy” differentiated the sex involved in 
the case from the category of sex acts situated in the reproductive cases and allowed the Court to 
cabin it away from the reach of individual privacy rights.  According to White, heterosexual 
procreative sex was protectable even if it was abortive or involved contraceptives.149  But non-
procreative sex acts between same-sex partners were not constitutionally protected because 
Bowers involved no child-rearing, family, or marital interests whatsoever.150  This categorization 
of sodomy, between same-sex and opposite-sex iterations, was the conduit for significant 
disrespect toward sexual minorities in Bowers.  It reflected a heteronormative preference because 
it resulted in a hierarchy that placed opposite-sex sex partners within a protected realm and left 
same-sex sex partners available for criminal conviction.   
The privacy protections denied in Bowers are significant for showing who and what the 
disrespect was directed toward.  Privacy in the realm of these cases covered individual 
autonomous choices that had fundamental affect to the persons whose rights had been 
constitutionally violated.  Correspondingly, refusing to recognize such rights in sexual minorities 
who “practiced homosexuality” denied sexual minorities recognition in the realm of sex, and 
denied them autonomy to decide whether to engage in behavior that had personal significances in 
intimacy, bonding, and sexual identity.  Along this trajectory between sex and privacy, it would 
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not have been difficult to link a protection of homosexual sodomy with the developing concepts 
regarding individuality in privacy and autonomy that the prior cases Hardwick and the Eleventh 
Circuit in Bowers relied upon to articulate their positions.  These cases exuded overtones of 
human dignity concepts despite not invoking the concept explicitly.151  Although the association 
between privacy and human dignity did not fully realize into the language of Supreme Court 
opinions until Planned Parenthood v. Casey152  came forth after Bowers, the dignity concepts 
associated alongside autonomy and privacy were already taking shape in prior privacy cases such 
as Griswold v. Connecticut.153      
The Court’s lack of respect fully realized when White further justified Georgia’s sodomy 
statute by referencing prior sodomy laws to bolster the notion that the right to engage 
homosexual sodomy had not been a deeply-rooted right under the history and tradition of the 
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   Justice Douglas’s understanding of the intertwining nature of dignity, privacy, and 
liberty would, of course, culminate in his opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, though he had 
already been playing with these ideas in the criminal law context (as seen above) and in several 
cases in the preceding years. And yet, his opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut does not mention 
human dignity at all. The right to privacy expounded upon in all the opinions in Griswold is 
significantly narrower than Douglas’s conception of dignity, limited as it may be to marital 
relations and to the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms” and grounded as it is in the penumbras 
of the first ten amendments. 
   But just as Justice Douglas’s focus on privacy would bear fruit in the later abortion 
cases, so too would his recognition that state intrusion into the private sphere of the individual 
might threaten his or her dignity. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, the Court wrote that “[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more 
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision - 
with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe - whether to end her 
pregnancy.”  
This would find slightly fuller expression in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where a 
plurality (comprising of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) jointly reaffirmed the principle 
that a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy receives some degree of constitutional protection. 
As in many other cases since Griswold, the plurality groups abortion with other decisions dealing 
with family, procreation, marriage, and raising children. What is new in Casey is the turn in the 
language from privacy to dignity[.]  
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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states.  White reported that “[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots”154 and then 
listed a historical catalogue of sodomy laws over three consecutive footnotes to legalistically 
belabor his assertion.155  Indeed, White’s sullying of homosexual sodomy here in Bowers was an 
advantageous transition to his eventual reason for upholding the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
anti-sodomy law.  According to White, the majoritarian view in Georgia that “homosexual 
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” is a rational basis for the law because “[t]he law . . . is 
constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are 
to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”156  First, 
the argument for affirming the Georgia statute based on morality against homosexuality, which 
White counted as strong and robust in Georgia, was rather weak and conclusory.  A majoritarian 
morality might contribute to the existence of a law that discriminates and marginalizes a 
particular subgroup of the population or such morality might permit laws that have bad 
consequences.157  Should this not have warranted that law’s invalidity?  Was this not observed in 
Loving v. Virginia, one of the cases that White distinguishes from Hardwick’s situation?  And 
what were these morals, if not reflective of heterosexism?  White did not explicitly reveal these 
morals in content but his reliance on the factual context of the privacy cases—family, marriage, 
procreation, child-rearing—and the deeply-rootedness of sexual practices in the history of the 
nation tended to hint at a heteronormative basis for these morals and values that cast sexual 
minorities in a disrespectful light.  The message in Bowers was clear—that consensual intimacy 
enjoyed by opposite-sex couples was protectable based on factual and moral situations that did 
allow recognize consensual same-sex intimacy indicative of same-sex preferences.  White’s 
denial of privacy here was important as far as exemplifying a politics of disrespect because the 
constitutional privacy protections that were not extended to sexual minorities also, in part, deny 
humanity.  Accordingly, Bowers lodged disrespect against sexual minorities engaging in 
consensual same-sex intimacy, which shamed, disgraced, and criminalized them in regards to 
particular conduct that could express their sexual identities.  All of which White justified through 
a hierarchy of protectable sex based on majoritarian values and a dismissal of privacy interests 
that he would probably have championed for heterosexual couples.        
 If Bowers was an example of how sexual minorities was cast within the politics of 
disrespect at the Supreme Court, then Romer v. Evans, a decade later, was an opinion that 
specifically associated a name with that disrespect:  animus.  Ironically, the law at issue, 
Colorado’s Amendment 2, a voter-initiated referendum to modify Colorado’s anti-discrimination 
statute to exclude protections toward discrimination based on sexual orientation, resembled the 
kind of law based in a majoritarian morality that White was reluctant to overrule in Bowers.  In 
this way, within the continuing politics of disrespect toward sexual minorities at the Supreme 
Court, Bowers and Romer were antithetical; even though Romer did not overrule Bowers, nor did 
it enumerate that a fundamental right to consensual same-sex intimacy existed, Romer did 
address the constitutionality of a law linked to morals that would have left sexual minorities out 
of discriminatory protections under the Colorado state constitution.  In interpreting Romer, 
Ronald Dworkin has noted that “[i]t is true that White spoke in terms of moral disapproval and 
Kennedy in terms of ‘animus.’  But there can be no difference in what these words mean in this 
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context.”158  At least in terms of morality specifically involved in the facts that led up to Romer, 
the context Dworkin alluded to reveals the politics of disrespect behind the campaign against 
protecting sexual orientation in Amendment 2.  
  When anti-discrimination ordinances were enacted in Colorado municipalities between 
the 1970s and early 1990s and protections based on sexual orientation became prominent,159 
efforts by a conservative Christian group in Colorado began to campaign for signatures to put 
Amendment 2 on a state referendum.160  Martha Nussbaum has observed that “[t]he campaign 
was clever” in that the initiators of the referendum convinced Colorado voters to pass the 
referendum through an “equal rights, not special rights” theme.161  As a result, “[t]hat gave 
ordinary citizens a reason to support the referendum without thinking that in so doing they were 
expressing dislike of gays and lesbians.”162  The Amendment read:   
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.  
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any 
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall 
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby 
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships 
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of 
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status 
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects 
self-executing.163   
Some voter conscience might have been assuaged by such campaigning but majoritarian 
disapproval could still be articulated into law.  And disrespect does not have to be captured 
within the subtext of majoritarian gestures alone.  The campaign for Amendment 2 explicitly 
conjured a sense of immorality in order to portray sexual minorities in a disrespectful light.  And 
heteronormative ideals about family, sex, and privacy versus the degradation of morals through 
same-sex conduct were part of the rhetoric:  “You may know that the sexual practices of gays 
differ drastically from those of most of Colorado’s population.  But how much these practices 
differ—and the dangerous perversions they involve—may shock you!”164   
Consensual same-sex behavior was again painted as choices that are morally 
blameworthy, in part because the campaigns call them “dangerous” and “perverse,” but also 
because the campaign affixed false assumptions with same-sex behavior:  “Gays have been 
unwilling (or unable) to curb their voracious, unsafe sex practices in the face of AIDS.”165  Then 
it listed purported sex behavior statistics:  “Overall, surveys show that 90% of gay men engage in 
anal intercourse—the most high risk sexual behavior in society today. . . . About 80% of gay 
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men surveyed have engaged in oral sex upon the anus of partners.  Well over a third of gays in 
1977 admitted to ‘fisting.’ “166  Not only do these alleged statistics about gay male same-sex 
behavior placed nearly all gay men in a depraved and diseased light—with the politics of 
disrespect being used prominently here—but the references to same-sex sodomy and other sex 
practices were of the non-procreative type outside of the morally dignifying patronage of 
heteronormative values.  The pamphlet’s punch-line revealed this rationale in a rhetorical 
question:  “Is this the kind of lifestyle we want to reward with special protection, and protected 
against ethnic status?  Gay activists want you to think they’re ‘just like you’—but these statistics 
point out how false that is.”167      
 Kennedy’s decision in Romer led him to call out such politics of disrespect, as “anything 
but animus toward the class it affects.”168  Unlike the deliberate and seemingly-just reliance on 
the politics of disrespect in Bowers to rationalize the singling out and criminalizing of sexual 
minorities under the Georgia statute, Kennedy’s opinion in Romer found a reflective opposite in 
that logic.  The morality is a hateful one and its service behind Amendment 2 to disadvantage 
sexual minorities was not justifiable.  In fact, unlike White in Bowers, Kennedy disregarded this 
relationship between morals and law even where the State proffered that Amendment 2 
“respect[s] other citizens’ freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or 
employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”169  Here inequality was 
not enough to maintain efficiency.  Kennedy dismissed the relationship between morals and law, 
morals that engendered disapproval and disrespect, because of the inequality Amendment 2 
perpetuates through that relationship.  In doing so, that politics of disrespect reared itself in the 
concept of animus.  In the gay rights canon of Supreme Court cases, Romer is definitively a case 
about unconstitutional animus.  Dignity was not specifically invoked by Kennedy but Romer was 
a post-Casey decision in which privacy issues had been eventually couched in the language and 
sentiments of dignity.170  There were, in the subtext, whisperings or murmurings of humanity 
that will help draw the jurisprudence for gay rights toward concepts of dignity and respect.  But 
distinctly, Romer called out disrespect and aligned it within a specific doctrine. 
B.  LAWRENCE AS RESPECT 
 Like Bowers, Lawrence involved consensual same-sex sexual behavior that fell within 
criminalization under a state sodomy statute.  But with Lawrence, the incremental journey that 
started with Bowers’ politics of disrespect—politics that was later located as animus in Romer—
now transitioned to recognize that sexual minorities deserved respect.  This was achieved partly 
through the advancement of privacy and dignity interests in the interim between Bowers and 
Lawrence—notably with Casey where the constitutional privacy rights stemming from 
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controversial cases such as Roe v. Wade that were on shakier ground during time of Bowers.171  
The social visibility of sexual minorities in the early 1990s and Romer’s anti-discrimination 
seemingly also contributed to respect in Lawrence.172   
 The two doctrinal approaches that facilitated Lawrence’s politics of respect appeared 
early in Kennedy’s decision.  The first was Kennedy’s willingness to explore the constitutional 
privacy aspects of the case to imagine an unenumerated constitutional due process protection that 
perhaps Bowers had failed (or refused) to see.  Kennedy’s incantation of privacy cases—Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters,173 Meyer v. Nebraska,174 Griswold v. Connecticut,175 Eisenstadt v. Baird,176 
Roe v. Wade,177 and Carey v. Population Services178—began the focus on the deeper aspects of 
consensual same-sex intimacy in Lawrence (and by analogy Bowers) than White’s legalistic 
contrast and delineation based on facts alone.179  Such incantation revisited the protections of 
privacy,180 autonomy,181 and individualism182 in those cases and facilitated import into 
protections for consensual same-sex intimacy.183  This connection between privacy cases and 
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consensual same-sex intimacy prompted the second approach to assist respect politics.  That 
approach involved the broadening of the due process issues regarding consensual same-sex 
intimacy from a Bowers-like fundamental rights inquiry regarding “homosexual sodomy” to one 
about the efficacy of the Texas law in “violat[ing defendants’] vital interests in liberty and 
privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”  and of Bowers 
itself.184  Helped also by his own account of the history of American sodomy laws and departing 
from White’s narrative in Bowers over how ancient that “ancient roots” observation was in the 
past persecution of gays,185 Kennedy’s broadening of the legal issue in Lawrence was a crucial 
step toward a politics of respect as it aligned interests in privacy and sex in Lawrence with 
privacy and dignitary interests in Casey.   
Once Kennedy invoked Casey, his reliance on Casey was not merely to superficially 
show that consensual same-sex intimacy has dignity for dignity’s sake.  Casey helped leverage 
dignitary interests so that Kennedy could use it to dislodge the connection between the Texas law 
and justifications through morality that had disrespected sexual minorities by devaluing their sex 
choices and behavior as blameworthy and disgusting.  Quoting Casey, Kennedy observed in a 
way reminiscent of his attack on morality in Romer that  
[i]t must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the 
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn 
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious 
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the 
traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound 
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire 
and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not 
answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may 
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through 
operation of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.”186  
If Romer was a case that involved disrespect as animus, Lawrence would become a case about 
the respect for sexual minorities articulated through dignity interests against the laws that attempt 
to marginalize them.  The justification for such judicial and constitutional regard was not morals-
based but more sweeping on a human level:  “ ‘At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs 
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.’ “187  This shift from what animated or governed the liberties at stake 
from morality to humanity was conducive to according respect for sexual minorities.  We see this 
underlying effect in Kennedy’s evaluation of harm arising from morals-based laws that regulated 
and inhibited aspects of humanity such as sexual freedom.  Using Romer to leverage and extend 
Casey, he drew from the example of when morals-based legislation, the basis for his concept of 
animus, can cause dignitary harm.  Once he associated Casey and Romer together, Kennedy 
further underscored that harm from disrespect on social and human terms:   
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Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct 
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, 
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.  If protected conduct is 
made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive 
validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for 
equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law 
of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.188  
It all ultimately justified the holding in Lawrence that Bowers’ “continuance as precedent 
demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”189  Lawrence was the Supreme Court’s opinion on 
dignity as respect for gay rights.  And as a result, that politics was reached.           
 Yet, as progressive as Lawrence was for same-sex sex partners in overturning Bowers 
and decriminalizing consensual same-sex intimacy, the slight problem with Lawrence in regards 
to respect politics was its narrow reading of sexual identity typified by the facts of Lawrence 
itself—i.e. the convictions of defendants because of their engaged sex acts—and by focus on the 
inquiry toward conduct rather than identity.   In fact, the opinion emphasized conduct by 
discussing the cases in terms of “the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy in 
persons making [reproductive] choices”190 in Casey, and in terms of how “[e]quality of treatment 
and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by substantive guarantee of 
liberty.”191  Of course, the underscoring on choices and conduct was consistent with the way in 
which the issues were framed to discuss “sexual intimacy” and not sexual identity.  But it kept 
the politics of respect adhered slightly to constitutional respect for the conduct, behavior, and 
choices indicative of sexual identity, but not directly for sexual identity itself.   
C.  WINDSOR AND OBERGEFELL:  MARRIAGE AND RESPECTABILITY 
 Although there was some achievement for respect in dignity for sexual minorities in 
Lawrence, the slippage created by the distance between respect politics and toward what it was 
specifically modifying—sexual conduct rather than sexual orientation—limited direct progress 
for sexual orientation anti-discrimination.  Lawrence, with its incantations to autonomy and 
privacy and its inquiry over the constitutionality of regulating sex acts, was more about 
according dignity to specific personal choices—and by extension, the constitutional protections 
over conduct, choices, and acts—rather than to identity precisely.  That slippage has produced 
mixed results for elevating anti-discrimination protections for sexual minorities, while advancing 
other goals within gay rights, particularly for achieving marriage equality.  For better or worse, 
the politics of the marriage context is soupy for developing an inherent respect for sexual 
minorities.  What also begins to emerge more readily between the politics of disrespect and 
respect was a growing trend toward respectability politics.   
 Kennedy’s decision in U.S. v. Windsor expressed this latter sentiment by aligning with 
Lawrence to protect choices, but also by differing in context because the choices made were not 
                                                 






as exclusively indicative of sexual identity.  They were also choices indicative of same-sex 
couples vying for positive social and legal recognition.  Marriage allowed for symbolic gesturing 
and visibility of relationships,192 of which sexual identity has very significant import.193  
However, the choice to marry short-changed sexual orientation because marriage, as it has been 
regarded modernly, has hardly been a same-sex institution or status.  Seeking marriage is toying 
and cooking with heteronormativity.  And even the gesture of seeking suggests that same-sex 
couples are vying for recognition from an already-subordinated position that leads to a question 
of worthiness—questions often answered by respectability. 
 This worth was what Kennedy’s decision in Windsor explored.  The opinion addressed 
DOMA by borrowing the doctrinal approach from Romer.  Yet post-Lawrence, the concepts of 
animus and dignity in gay rights were much more concretely and evenly realized.  Animus and 
dignity were intertwined as an anti-stereotyping principle that drew out the inequality that 
DOMA propagated against state-recognized same-sex marriages by consequently not 
recognizing them on the federal level.  Kennedy linked the two concepts in a correlative sense to 
demonstrate how an irrational hatred against gays and their desire to marry in order to achieve 
recognition—i.e. animus—manifested as a strong moral disapproval itself within congressional 
intent for DOMA.  Such animus or hatred could not support a law that perpetuated inequality and 
stigma—i.e. harms to dignity—by creating a hierarchy between same-sex and opposite-sex 
relationships on the federal level when no such hierarchy existed between both relationship 
groups in the marriage schemes of particular states that sanctioned same-sex or opposite-sex 
marriages, such as New York.  In this way, DOMA interfered with the way in which states 
regulated marriage that not only stirred up discrimination against same-sex couples but also 
federalism implications as well.194   
Kennedy’s legislative scrutiny uncovered to no surprise that DOMA was backed by a 
moral disapproval that embodied disrespect toward same-sex couples:  “The House concluded 
the DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that 
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’ “195  He 
noted that “[t]he stated purpose of [DOMA] was to promote an ‘interest in protecting the 
traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws.’ “196   Animus served to 
enliven DOMA and was instilled by disrespect toward minority sexual orientations that preferred 
to keep same-sex couples out of marriage.  The next question was whether that animus, as in 
Romer, also contained a bare desire to harm, which Kennedy found in its ability “to identify a 
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subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal.  The principal purpose is to impose 
inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency.”197  That was its “principle 
effect.”198 
Hence, the concept of dignity in Romer and Lawrence found accord with Windsor.  
Inequality as harm in DOMA had dignity implications beyond rights and benefits.  As Kennedy 
observed, that harm was also figurative because the rights and incidents denied federally 
“enhance the dignity and integrity of the person.”199  However, unlike the dignity of the freedom 
of couples to engage in same-sex intimacy in Lawrence—where dignity precluded morally 
blameworthy judgment regarding those intimate choices that could translate into disrespect—
Kennedy discussed the harm through dignity with more subjectivity here in Windsor, expressly 
illustrating how the inequality of DOMA creates a discussion of worthiness.  At first the 
language seemed to direct us toward the type of dignity in Lawrence:   “By creating two 
contradictory marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as 
married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus 
diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it 
proper to acknowledge and protect.”200  Then, however, it appeared that Kennedy veered strictly 
away from that course by defining dignity as worthiness:  “By this dynamic DOMA undermines 
both the public and private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those 
couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal 
recognition.”201  Shortly-thereafter, Kennedy returned to discussing how the inequality or 
“differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution 
protects.”202   Yet then Kennedy also noted that the inequality has led to demeaning the couple 
“whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”203  The vacillation between the inequality of 
DOMA that demeaned or disrespected same-sex couples and the dignified status that traditional 
heteronormative marriage conveyed upon same-sex couples if recognized creates ambiguity.  
One reading could be that marriage dignified all relationships because that has been a social 
norm—regardless of opposite-sex or same-sex coupling.  And yet another reading could be that 
marriage dignified same-sex relationships in the ways that no existing commitment status in 
same-sex relationships could.  This ambiguity begged the question:  what would make same-sex 
couples worthy to be dignified through marriage?  This duality has added a spoonful of the 
politics of respectability in Windsor’s attempts to address gay rights and discrimination.   
Additionally, it is the decision to marry—i.e. the choices and conduct—that the politics 
of respect and respectability go toward enhancing, not sexual orientation itself.   All of this 
meditating is calibrated towards conduct and choices and the worth of such effort, rather than 
respect for sexual identity or orientation:  “For the same-sex couple who wished to be married, 
the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.  This status is a far-reaching legal 
acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the 
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State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.”204  This result in 
Windsor created much more equality amongst married couples, same-sex or otherwise.  But was 
it equality tempered by respectability?  And what did this do for sexual orientation directly?       
 Obergefell v. Hodges probed at deeper questions about the way sexual minorities have 
either negotiated themselves into a favorable status within the law and by extension within 
society at large.  Its advancement for marriage equality was great, obviously. But from 
Obergefell, the advancement for sexual orientation anti-discrimination was not quite as absolute.  
At first on the constitutional level, Kennedy’s due process inquiry here would seem to be helpful 
towards equality because the broadness of a “fundamental right to marry” inquiry versus a 
“fundamental right to same-sex marriage” inquiry invited comparisons with the way the 
constitutional issue of sodomy was framed in Lawrence.  In Obergefell as it was in Lawrence, 
the inquiry here was set broadly and not narrowly, thus allowing for extension to same-sex 
couples of the fundamental right to marry.205   
 But whatever potential the broadness of Kennedy’s due process inquiry in Obergefell 
might have connoted, the actual shape and perspective of Obergefell’s due process inquiry was 
not quite like Lawrence after all.  Lawrence’s fundamental rights inquiry regarding sodomy laws 
was an example of a resolution cast more so under a negative rights inquiry, involving questions 
into unnecessary or unconstitutional state burdens on individual liberties.206  Even if the 
conclusion held that sexual minorities have constitutional rights to engage consensually in sex 
that had been otherwise criminalized by state sodomy laws and therefore invalidating such 
sodomy laws, the state burdens upon liberties were ultimately phrased negatively and not 
positively in Lawrence.  In Obergefell, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process inquiry was cast 
under a positive rights analysis—whether the fundamental right to marry for opposite-sex 
couples extends to same-sex couples.207  In some ways, the differences also revealed the 
disparities between state criminalizing of same-sex intimacy and state bans on recognizing 
marital status in same-sex relationships.  In Bowers and Lawrence, same-sex couples were 
already engaging in consensual sexual activity long before the enforcement of anti-sodomy laws.  
By contrast, in Obergefell, because marriage was a practice given state legal pronouncement 
only upon opposite-sex couples traditionally, same-sex couples were not legally married prior to 
state marriage bans.  In this way, it was hard to articulate that same-sex couples had a practice or 
choice in marriage that was constitutionally protected and subsequently infringed upon by state 
marriage bans.  Instead, in Obergefell, the Court’s answer to the fundamental right to marriage 
question was resolved in a more positive rather than negative rights approach, recognizing that 
same-sex couples should have fundamental marriage rights that they did not have under the 
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Constitution the night before the Obergefell decision.208  Ultimately, the distinctions between 
Lawrence and the realities of litigating the same-sex marriage issue could be reconciled through 
an expansive reading of Lawrence, drawing on its broadness and moments of commingling 
liberty and equality on issues of sex, privacy, and relationships to influence and resolve the 
same-sex marriage debate.209  But in Obergefell, the distinctions also led to a compromise for 
sexual orientation anti-discrimination in the decision’s promise of marriage rights to same-sex 
couples, whereas an equality inquiry in Obergefell contingent on finding marriage bans 
discriminated based on sexual orientation might not.210     
 There are other reasons that Kennedy’s fundamental rights inquiry compromised 
advancement for sexual orientation anti-discrimination.  Kennedy’s application of the 
fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples in Obergefell extended an institution, practice, 
and/or status that even he explicitly emphasized as something that historically has been 
heterosexist.211  This heterosexism underscored a heteronormative bias that Kennedy had to 
downplay or at least a wholesale heterosexual attribute of the practice of marriage traditionally 
that Kennedy had to insist was evolving.  Either way, he uses that heterosexual characteristic 
implicitly as the demarcation line of exclusion.  This was his starting point.  The bigger 
implication from this starting point later when he persuasively extends the fundamental right to 
marriage to same-sex couples was that Kennedy’s judicial extension of the right to marry 
possibly imported same-sex couples into a heteronormative world.   In this way, the Obergefell 
decision recognized and preserved the heterosexual presence of marriage, envisioned same-sex 
couples as seeking the right to marry, and invariably played the dynamics in order to extend that 
right to same-sex couples by relying on respectability politics.   
Respectability politics in Obergefell emerged first through Kennedy’s version of 
marriage—how it possessed and imparted dignity through its transformative powers based on its 
historical connotations—and secondly from his evaluation of whether same-sex couples, who 
were asking for marriage, should be extended that right.  At the decision’s opening, Kennedy 
situated his marriage ruling within the language of dignity and identity, praising marriage as 
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something that offered “promised nobility and dignity” 212 and “allows two people to find a life 
that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons.”213  It 
came as no surprise after Lawrence and Casey that Obergefell would have relied on dignity 
interests in order to articulate the constitutional implications in a couple’s decision to marry.  He 
talked up marriage in the most human sense—quoting Confucius and Cicero, and generalizing 
the “beauty of marriage” expressed in religion, philosophy, and art.214  But the transcendent 
qualities of marriage are limited; they are shortly tempered by Kennedy’s “fair and necessary” 
realization that “these references [to marriage] were based on the understanding that marriage is 
a union between two persons of the opposite sex.”215  This realization was an indication that 
Kennedy seemed to locate marriage within heteronormative traditions and values.   
 His full-throated vagueness here, like in Windsor, created slippage.  Though Obergefell 
ultimately extended a fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples, what was consistent with 
that positive rights framing of the issue offered not respect for sexual identity or even same-sex 
couples but a possible respectability.  Marriage has not been an inherent entitlement for same-sex 
couples as it has been for opposite-sex couples since antiquity.  As a long-standing heterosexual 
status and practice, marriage dignified relationships and was being sought by same-sex couples 
who seek to be recognized.  Ultimately, they had to show that they had earned it.  
 We see this evaluation in the thrust of Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell.  As he justified 
extending marriage, he revisited concepts of animus and dignity and intertwined them as he did 
in Windsor as anti-stereotyping principle to mediate toward respectability.  The correlation 
between animus that propagated laws and the harms to dignity was at once a narrative structure 
in which a history of exclusion of sexual minorities and same-sex relationships were 
uncovered—a history that bore constitutional significance because it was animated by hatred and 
disrespect toward sexual minorities and created the marriage bans at issue, and consequently a 
history of legal exclusion stemming from animus that resulted in bans on certain personal 
choices that limited autonomy in such a way that harmed human dignity.   But because the 
mediating goal was marriage equality through respectability, both animus and dignity were 
calibrated to that effect in Obergefell. 
 The use of animus and dignity as an anti-stereotyping device that channeled toward the 
right to marriage in Obergefell led Kennedy to discuss distinctly the dignity implications of 
marriage alongside acknowledging the dignitary harms that exclusion from marriage caused.  
Here Obergefell’s reliance on dignity focused on how much having a marriage right conferred 
dignity and how same-sex couples now qualified to get that right.  According to Kennedy, there 
were “four principles and traditions [that] demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental 
under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”216  Essentially, these four 
principles and traditions allowed Kennedy to specifically evaluate the qualifications of same-sex 
couples to be given the right to marry.  Each of these principles and traditions dealt, in their own 
manner, with what marriage conferred upon a couple and how same-sex couples, as far as each 
principle and tradition was concerned, qualified to receive marriage.  The first was the 
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importance of marriage for facilitating personal choice, autonomy, and self-definition:  “Choices 
about marriage shape an individual’s destiny.”217  The way in which Kennedy justified 
conferring marriage to same-sex couples from this aspect of marriage was connected to dignity:  
“There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their 
autonomy to make such profound choices.”218  Curiously, Kennedy identified this dignity and 
used it to find same-sex couples were sufficiently qualified to receive the right to marry. Yet, had 
Kennedy avoided qualifications and merely described the harms to dignity that animus-filled 
bans on marriage have had on decisions in their relationships, this “sufficient” qualification 
would have likely connoted less respectability through dignity and more on respect.  Similarly in 
the second principle and tradition of marriage that Kennedy analyzed, where marriage “supports 
a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals,”219 a 
likewise rhetorical theme arose in which Kennedy discussed what marriage conferred and 
whether same-sex couples qualified enough to obtain the right to marry, rather than showing the 
harms to personal dignity.  Marriage “ ‘dignifies couples who ‘wish to define themselves by their 
commitment to each other.’ “220  Since such couples had traditionally been opposite-sex ones, the 
dignifying characteristic of marriage reflected a paternalistic, heteronormative value that placed 
married opposite-sex couples above cohabiting opposite-sex couples.  The type of dignity that 
marriage gives was not about inherent dignity that was entitled to respect but about respectability 
accorded to couples who chose to register themselves as married rather than unmarried; and 
likewise it would expand similarly amongst same-sex couples, creating a hierarchy between 
married and unmarried same-sex couples.  Again, the discussion of this second attribute of 
marriage was imbued with a certain dignity that is achieved based on worthiness obtained from a 
comparison to opposite-sex couples and not inherent entitlement or respect.   
On the surface, the third attribute seemed to possess a difference from the first two as it 
appeared to discuss the dignitary harms that families with same-sex parents suffered because of 
the exclusion out of wedlock.221  Marital rights of parents also impart substantive rights, 
incidents, and presumptions of parenting in certain instances that escaped unmarried parents with 
children, particularly if there are no blood relations.222   Absent rights to marry, children of 
unmarried same-sex parents lack legitimacy: “Without the recognition, stability, and 
predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are 
somehow lesser.”223  The stigma—or dignitary harm—might be disrespect because of the 
heterosexist hierarchy marriage created, but the bigger message here was that marriage was the 
foremost way to connote family.  This, again, like the previous aspect regarding marriage, was a 
traditional but somewhat outdated view—both arcane toward modern families and ironic in its 
injection in a case about the changing face of marriage.  To be sure, marriage can have major 
social benefits to parents and families.  But the harm to dignity should be about the potential for 
segregating between families of same-sex couples and unmarried opposite-sex couples on the 
one hand, and married opposite-sex couples on the other; the stigma was about discrimination if 
one class of families was favored over another based on the values placed on the constructed 










status of marriage.  Families were not “somehow lesser” inherently because they stood outside 
the institution of marriage.  Rather the more correct perspective was that families should be 
viewed as having inherent dignities to be respected under the law.   
Finally, the last attribute Kennedy mentioned to justify extending the right to marry for 
same-sex couples was its symbolism.  “[M]arriage is the keystone of our social order,” Kennedy 
wrote.; and as a result of that social exultation of marriage, “just as a couple vows to support 
each other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and 
material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”224  Once again, marriage gives something and 
here as the pinnacle of social order—or heteronormative hierarchy—it gave legitimacy to the 
marrying couples.  Since same-sex couples were traditionally excluded from marriage, they have 
suffered from denials in certain privileges attached to marriage:  “Yet by virtue of their exclusion 
from that institution, same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States 
have linked to marriage.”225  But that harm had also symbolic connotations because “[s]ame-sex 
couples are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in 
their own lives.226  This observation was the closest to describing harm to dignity from the 
animus and disrespect to same-sex couples that would require redress through marriage 
calibrated in respect.  However, after describing this harm, what followed was respectability:  
“Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek 
fulfillment in its highest meaning.”227  The focus here should have been fully on the dignitary 
harm that the marriage exclusion inflicted on same-sex couples and not to the dignifying 
qualities of marriage and its symbolism.  With that last statement, the sentiment became again 
patronizing, drawing this section back to respectability politics.   
After all these justifications, Kennedy pronounced that same-sex couples may be given 
the fundamental right to marriage.  He used the animus-dignity connection as a mediating device, 
an anti-stereotyping principle, to evaluate whether that extension would be justifiable based on 
analogous interests that he viewed same-sex couples shared in their relationships versus the 
essential attributes that marriage embodied.  What was problematic here was that the objective of 
marriage equality here was preceded and was affected by the politics of respectability.  In turn, 
that respectability was being channeled by the animus-dignity connection to justify the 
worthiness of same-sex couples in seeking and obtaining marriage for themselves.  Marriage, as 
Kennedy portrayed either knowingly or inadvertently, conferred not only dignity through 
respectability but heteronormative values and demands that might have expected same-sex 
couples to negotiate their subjugation once marriage was available to them.  This was not dignity 
as respect, which would have been ideal, but it was dignity as respectability, which deviated 
from Lawrence.   
 From the politics of disrespect in Bowers to respect in Lawrence and now to the politics 
of respectability in Obergefell, progress seemed to have stalled if human worth is earned and 
inherently respected.  One might have surmised that that progress would have been more 
absolute—linear in trajectory.  But more true to political incrementalism, lasting change may 
come from a spiraling movement that must process back and forth, from one station of progress 
                                                 






to another.   Accordingly, once respect was obtained in Lawrence, it was not impossible to 
conceive of veering in Obergefell, which it did.  The question in Part IV is how to right the 
course.   
IV.  RESTORING RESPECT 
 For same-sex relationships and families, obtaining nationwide marriage recognition at the 
Supreme Court was a monumental step—even in the face of past criticisms regarding its efficacy 
for formal equality.  Justifiably, after decades of judicial and legislative disrespect towards same-
sex relationships in denying requests for marriage, Obergefell was a cause for genuine 
celebration, in real life or on social media.  Marriage imports rights and benefits to support 
relationships and families that an otherwise unmarried status would not.  And symbolically, the 
recognition of marriage provides some legitimization of same-sex relationships and families 
from the dominant culture, which consequently brings visibility and acceptance to the lives of 
sexual minorities.   
 There are limitations, however, to the specific procurement of marriage equality in 
Obergefell.  From an ideological perspective, the Ettelbrick/Stoddard questions linger cautiously 
regarding its efficacy and value, as marriage characteristically was the epitome of monogamous 
heterosexual relationships that promoted heteronormative—and arguably heterosexist—views on 
family, childrearing, sexuality, and gender.  Its traditional subordination of women, which still 
has remnants here and there, poses serious implications for same-sex relationships and how they 
are perceived or even subordinated by the dominant culture.228  An institution that, by itself, 
historically fostered the subordination of women in ways analogically similar to Adrienne Rich’s 
concept of “compulsory heterosexuality,”229 could suggest its incompatibility for the symbolic 
recognition of same-sex relationships unless same-sex relationships affirmatively and 
unapologetically undergo an appropriation of marriage that weds the symbolic shell of marriage 
with substantive merits and values of gay existence.  That development would align itself with 
Thomas Stoddard’s original thoughts and hopes for same-sex marriage in 1989.230  Otherwise, 
Ettelbrick’s view might prevail somewhat more strongly as the politics of respectability extends 
into the post-Obergefell period, allowing for heteronormative values to potentially morph and 
cross over to subordinate same-sex relationships.231   
 Doctrinally-speaking, this milestone in the marriage equality movement leaves gay rights 
at the Supreme Court with a strong admission of respectability politics that could functionally 
and philosophically inhibit long-term anti-discrimination advances for sexual minorities.  
Kennedy’s use of dignity in Obergefell, which leaves us in the politics of respectability—in the 
realms of rank and hierarchy—should provoke unease as the likelihood for stratification 
continues, this time more subtly than outright disrespect (as in Bowers).  Respectability politics 
reinforces social hierarchies and places heterosexual values over the values of other groups in 
exchange for acceptance that is fundamentally less egalitarian from the get-go.  The realities of 
Obergefell from this examination here indicate we are still in a place where heteronormative 
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values frame our ideas about sexual identity and orientation in ways that might stave off a more 
true-to-form theory of human existence within formal equality.  In addition, that gap is even 
furthered by the fundamental rights approach that focused on extending the marriage right to 
same-sex couples but gave short-shrift to the equal protection potential for sexual orientation 
anti-discrimination.  The unanswered questions regarding heightened protections for sexual 
orientation from Windsor continue to linger.  Sexual minorities cannot avail themselves to 
protected classifications under the 14th amendment, but they are, at least, respectable.   
 Yet even if it seems that in the contest between #LoveWins and #GayWins, the former 
has prevailed over the latter, hope still resides.  None of this is ever a total and infinite loss.  
Observations about progress in the gay rights movement often expose incrementalist tendencies 
in which intervals of small steps eventually culminate and advance into bigger, more significant 
changes.  The theory of political incrementalism posits that progress on a heavy societal topic 
pressing the consciousness of a large body politic often resembles the slow mental ruminations 
that a person might engage in over an important issue.232  Change perseverates back and forth on 
the pros and cons until a clear resolution is reached—a more or less, two-steps-forward-but-one-
step-back approach.233   
Even in the road to marriage equality, the movements and shifts to Obergefell on the 
federal level did not advance at all cleanly from one stage to another, but the movement was a 
spiraling back-and-forth along a trajectory in which the changing norms for gay rights finally 
gave the impetus for a movement forward to marriage.234  One of the important acts that drove 
this shape of progress was the repeated and persistent leveraging of one victory, however large or 
small, for another victory down the line, and so on and so forth.  This notion of incrementalism 
specifically in gay rights is compounded with the observations that countries slow down on gay 
rights after marriage,235 creating an urgency that proponents of gay rights must capture the 
excitement of gay marriage and the enthusiasm over social acceptance of gays to then carefully 
springboard to advancements in sexual orientation anti-discrimination that are more truly 
egalitarian and more precisely locate the existence of sexual minorities within the politics of 
respect.   
 On the federal level, absent legislation that guarantees protections against discrimination, 
such as Title VII, constitutional case law should continue to develop and underscore individual 
rights protections for sexual minorities.236  Accordingly, the same 14th Amendment due process 
and equal protection realm would serve as doctrinal venue to stretch gay rights advocacy in a 
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counter-majoritarian way that could perhaps provoke a supportive legislative response down the 
line.   Now that major gay rights litigation can continue more steadily outside the direct context 
of marriage,237 discrimination cases under both due process and equal protection theories can 
litigate more directly over discrimination based on sexual orientation rather than discrimination 
over relationship status.  Such judicial inquiry into discrimination based on sexual orientation 
could focus itself back to identity without as many contextual filters that allow courts to take 
themselves away from difficult conversations regarding the acceptance of minority sexual 
orientations, particularly now that the climate for sexual minorities is more open and promising 
in the post-Obergefell era.   
Consequentially, these future cases must persist with exploring and preserving the dignity 
interests of sexual minorities.  Dignity, from Lawrence, still has its currency and should not be 
abandoned in judicial advancements in sexual orientation.  Rather, pro-gay litigants must now 
continue to draw upon dignity, in part, to couch their cases against discrimination post-
Obergefell—except that dignity must not trigger a politics of respectability.  It must be 
recalibrated back towards a politics of respect, where it serves to advance an entitlement and not 
worth that is earned.   The following explores three ways. 
A.  DIGNITY IN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 In the Due Process context, if indeed Kenji Yoshino’s vision regarding the end of equal 
protection doctrine is correct and that due process liberty protections are the current and future 
engines of constitutional change for marginalized groups,238 then the opportunities that were 
available for the use of dignity in Lawrence and Obergefell will likely continue in future cases 
that deal with violations of fundamental rights issues.  Shortly, within the immediate aftermath of 
Obergefell, both Nan Hunter and Laurence Tribe in their own respects concurred with Yoshino 
about due process jurisprudence—at least that the rise of liberty has underscored the triumphs of 
sexual minorities against discrimination in constitutional case law.239  And in Obergefell 
specifically, Yoshino articulated that Kennedy’s opinion here was furthering an approach in 
substantive due process jurisprudence that favors a more “open-ended common law approach,” 
traced to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman,240 and was later followed by Casey.241  As 
Yoshino summarizes, Harlan’s approach “outlined a balancing methodology that weighed 
individual liberties against governmental interest in a reasoned manner.  Such an approach 
always occurred against a backdrop of tradition, but was not shackled to the past, not least 
because tradition was itself ‘a living thing.’ “242  The anti-thesis of this approach was the more 
“formulaic” one that the Court used in Washington v. Glucksberg,243 where “to be recognized as 
a due process liberty a right had to be ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and 
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‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ It also required a ‘ “careful description” ’ of the 
asserted fundamental interest.”244  In this way, “the Court was more open to recognizing negative 
‘freedom from’ rights than positive ‘freedom to’ rights—though to be clear, it did not formally 
require the alleged right to fall on the ‘negative-right’ side of the divide.”245  One could already 
anticipate Kennedy’s preference for a more one-ended, perhaps more holistic approach in 
Obergefell from the differences between his majority opinion in Lawrence and that of Justice 
White’s in Bowers.  In Lawrence, the intimate association of consensual same-sex partners was 
couched in broader terms so that privacy concerns could draw forth the fundamental rights 
violations.  In contrast, Bowers executed a narrower categorization of sexual acts between same-
sex and opposite-sex couples that followed from the use of a more formulaic approach to 
substantive due process, which permitted morality to stifle any fundamental rights recognition 
and protection.   The focus from the benefits of the liberty approaches in Lawrence and 
Obergefell combined is what Yoshino calls an “anti-subordination principle” that the Court, in 
Yoshino’s word, can use to “guide a proper understanding of the guarantee of ‘liberty’ in the 
future (as it has in the past)”246 and perhaps provide for “[d]iscerning new liberties” as “more an 
art than a science.”247  The bigger implication from Yoshino is that “[t]his increased emphasis 
could serve to close as well as to open new channels of liberty.  For this reason, this new birth of 
freedom is also a new birth of equality.”248  A conclusion about Obergefell in this way elevates 
its potential beyond its landmark utility for bringing marriage to same-sex relationships and 
serving to dignify same-sex couples and their families.  There is a saving grace here if an anti-
subordination concept is paired with the Court’s parting words in Obergefell—that beyond 
marriage same-sex couples “ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law”249 and that “[t]he 
Constitution grants them that right.”250  From Obergefell into future cases addressing 
marginalization of rights based on a bias against a minority sexual orientation, dignity rights 
articulation should continue to be strengthened. 
 As Nan Hunter notes that post-Obergefell, “[a]dditional challenges to laws that restrict 
liberty within the zone of intimate association seem inevitable”251—which seems to broaden 
potential discrimination cases here beyond the marriage context252:   
The Supreme Court has described the prototype of intimate association as 
relationships that involve “deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily 
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of 
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s 
life.”  Cases brought on this ground have often involved plaintiffs who were fired 
from public sector jobs, frequently in law enforcement, for beginning romantic 
relationships with co-workers or offenders in violation of agency policies.253    
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But Hunter seems to be unsure on “how the liberty right recognized in Obergefell will interact 
with government policies that ban or impose penalties for intimate associations in workplace or 
other settings.”254  Applying an antisubordination concept to the equal dignity concept in 
Obergefell that competed with respectability politics in that case might serve to help answer 
Hunter’s uncertainty.  The pairing in future Due Process cases could solidify dignity interests 
and rights when dealing with fundamental rights violations with a sexual orientation 
component—perhaps discrimination of same-sex cohabitation based outside of marriage (taking 
us in the context somewhere between Lawrence and Obergefell) or in cases that somehow pit 
sexual orientation with First Amendment rights and public accommodations.  Tribe has noted 
that “[t]he doctrine of equal dignity signals the beginning of the end for discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation in areas like employment and housing, which remains legal in many 
states and has yet to be expressly banned in federal legislation.”255  Accordingly, dignity in due 
process cases is less nebulous as critics have noted; instead, “[t]he constitutional principle of 
equal dignity also gives the lie to public officials who discriminate against LGBT individuals.”256  
In Tribe’s First Amendment example that mentions Kim Davis (the county clerk from Kentucky 
who personally challenged the Obergefell ruling by refusing to issue marriage licenses until she 
was able to do so in a way that was aligned with her religious beliefs), Tribe notes that    
[a]s the Obergefell majority makes clear, the First Amendment must protect the 
rights of such individuals, even when they are agents of government, to voice 
their personal objections—this, too, is an essential part of the conversation—but 
the doctrine of equal dignity prohibits them from acting on those objections, 
particularly in their official capacities, in a way that demeans or subordinates 
LGBT individuals and their families by preventing them from giving legal force 
to their marriage vows.257 
 
If there is a continued trend to couple dignity with the anti-subordination approach from 
Obergefell outside the marriage context, the use of dignity might ultimately sustain cases that 
achieve anti-discrimination based on fundamental rights theories.  It might restore respect.   
B.  RESPECT IN EQUAL PROTECTION 
 Even if equal protection is relied upon instead of due process for propagating and 
justifying dignity interests after Obergefell, dignity as respect could still resurge as a concept that 
animates the invidiousness of discrimination based on minority sexual orientation.  The shell of 
dignity from Windsor, despite it being from a marriage case, has much import potential into from 
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one equality jurisprudence case to another because of its use in that decision.  Again, no longer 
limited in the marriage context, equal protection claims based on sexual orientation would side-
step entirely one probable circumstance that could divert discussions purely on the basis of 
discrimination to those based on sameness—thus incurring notions of respectability.  What is left 
behind from Windsor is the doctrinal assessment of scrutiny based on animus borrowed from 
Romer, now solidified by the DOMA case in that more searching form toward discrimination 
premised on sexual orientation—despite questions of whether it was a higher form of rational 
basis or something else.  In addition, the narrative structure of sexual orientation discrimination 
based on sexual orientation could also survive in future cases by carrying over the animus-
dignity connection that shows the animus behind a discriminatory exclusion of sexual minorities 
correspondingly hurts their dignity interests because it sustains a politics of disrespect.  The 
remnant from Obergefell is the further solidification of animus and dignity concepts as an anti-
stereotyping principle.  With a continued focus on litigating the dignity interests and rights of 
sexual minorities under equal protection claims, dignity would be more easily recalibrated to a 
politics of respect where the focus falls more naturally on violations against the inherent 
humanity of sexual minorities—with their minority sexual orientation as proxy for humanity—
rather than solely and particularly on the cultural assimilation of same-sex couples and families.  
In those opportunities to litigate, a recalibration of the anti-stereotyping properties of the animus-
dignity connection must occur in which dignity reflects respect and not respectability.   
 From Romer, Windsor, and Obergefell, animus has been used to reveal the politics of 
disrespect underneath the heterosexist disapproval flagrantly inflicted upon gays but couched in 
moral terms. Animus has been used to address that disrespect—by noting that such disrespect for 
their humanity engenders laws that are consequently discriminatory.  The impact of animus and 
its discriminatory harms are brought out even further when such harms are couched within 
dignity concepts that can show that animus or disrespect serves to offend humanist interests that 
also violate constitutional principles of liberty and equality.  From Lawrence, dignity emerged in 
gay rights as way to speak about the inherent worth of sexual minorities as it did in Casey about 
the individual personhood interests of women.  And by facilitating this conversation, dignity also 
points to what exactly needs to be protected and preserved in individual rights jurisprudence: 
autonomy and personhood—not respectability.  Thus, respect should be reserved for an 
individual’s sexuality as an extension of an inherent part of his or her identity or personhood, and 
respect is the better choice in future cases.  Accordingly, returning to dignity as respect in the 
constitutional litigation of gay rights in equal protection helps recover the anti-discrimination 
aspect of the gay rights movement in a more appropriate light.   
C.  RESPECT AND IMMUTABILITY 
A further guarantee for future equal protection cases to recalibrate dignity as respect 
might be through its help for courts to articulate sexual identity as an immutable trait in cases 
that are prone to finding discrimination against sexual minorities.  Immutability serves as one of 
the several factors federal courts have reserved for determining a protectable trait under the 14th 
Amendment.258  But until recently, the debate over a person’s sexual orientation and its 
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immutability was tipped in favor of mutability, particularly when homosexuality was considered 
immoral or biologically aberrant.  Indeed, nature or nurture, biology or choice, the dilemma over 
immutability has been an issue that has plagued the finding of sexual orientation as protected 
class for heightened scrutiny.  Perhaps it was the misunderstanding of homosexuality as an 
immoral lifestyle (which means you can choose) or pathology (which means you can be cured) 
that made it hard to see sexual orientation as an immutable trait.  In any event, for gays, 
immutability was one of the hardest factors to substantiate in favor of finding protected class 
status, and therefore, any elevation for heightened protections under equality jurisprudence for 
sexual minorities was stalled.     
To ask whether a trait was changeable in terms of nature or nurture implied that courts 
traditionally defined immutability more so along the lines of biological mutability.259  Cases in 
this vein often would explain the immutability factor by calling it “accident of birth.”260 Over the 
years, however, out of a minority of cases, a reinterpretation of the immutability factor occurred 
where its definition honed in on a trait’s significance in terms of one’s personhood so much so 
that one should not be coerced into changing the trait.261   Hence, the immutability of the trait—
or the efficacy of forcing mutability upon the trait—became of a means to find the fundamental 
importance of the trait, and not an end to itself for describing the biology of it.  The way in which 
courts would determine whether this factor weighed in favor of a protected class finding would 
be to render how “immutable” a trait was by weighing out the fundamental nature in the face of 
interferences with some sort of coerced conformity that would change that trait.  From that 
aspect, it is possible to see that this meaning of immutability carved out by certain courts, “is 
sensitive to the importance of self-concept and embraces the idea that certain characteristics are 
core to an individual’s sense of self and thus must be deemed unalterable.”262   
The contentious history behind determining the immutability of sexual orientation itself 
has a start in the politics of disrespect.  But post-Lawrence, and when marriage began to acquire 
more traction after Goodridge, that history started to shift in the redefinition immutability 
frequently at state levels in courts that had decided on the marriage equality issue in the short 
period before Windsor and in the period up to Obergefell.  In 2008, the California Supreme 
Court, in part, took note of the Ninth Circuit’s use of the minority definition of immutability in 
its suspect classification of sexual orientation in In re Marriage Cases:  “Because a person’s 
sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a 
person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory 
treatment.”263  Soon after, the state supreme courts in Connecticut and Iowa respectively found 
the same in their pro-gay marriage cases.264  
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But at this point, there is little guidance in the federal courts regarding this factor’s 
current incarnation in constitutional case law after Obergefell.  There is criticism about the 
efficacy of this newer, less formulaic definition from its seemingly empirical older sibling, as 
well as the definition’s champions.265  But its use to find sexual orientation as suspect trait in one 
of the lower federal court marriage decisions in the Sixth Circuit that eventually consolidated 
with others to become Obergefell does reveal some continuing dependence on immutability as 
part of the four-factor test for protected traits in recent equality jurisprudence.  In Obergefell v. 
Wymyslo,266 the federal district court in Ohio was quick to use the less formulaic, more holistic 
approach:  “To the extent that “immutability” is relevant to the inquiry of whether to apply 
heightened scrutiny, the question is not whether a characteristic is strictly unchangeable, but 
whether the characteristic is a core trait or condition that one cannot or should not be required to 
abandon.”267  From there, despite “now broad medical and scientific consensus that sexual 
orientation is immutable,”268 the Wymyslo court intimated its appeal for the less formulaic, less 
empirical definition and stated that “[e]ven more importantly, sexual orientation is so 
fundamental to a person’s identity that one ought not be forced to choose between one’s sexual 
orientation and one’s rights as an individual—even if such a choice could be made.”269  As 
support, the Wymyslo court cited to Lawrence and its underlying endorsement of individual 
autonomy in the Supreme Court’s holding to reveal how it interpreted the importance of this less 
rigid definition of immutability.270  Other federal marriage cases leading up to Obergefell that 
adopted the same meaning of immutability have cited also to Lawrence in similar vein.271 
Essentially the way in which Wymyslo and other federal cases have aligned this definition 
of immutability with Lawrence’s regards for autonomy and personhood in adopting it to find that 
sexual orientation is a protected trait for heightened scrutiny exhibits some degree of accord with 
the politics of respect.  Between respect and respectability, this second definition of immutability 
seems to favor respect because of these doctrinal connections to individual freedoms and 
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identity.  It shifts its balancing toward inherent identity rather than negotiation.  There is almost a 
negative rights analysis associated with liberty embedded in the analysis of interference with 
change to a particular trait with “the right to be who you are” basically represented by a certain 
inherent autonomy that the factor recognizes.272  Thus, it embodies both anti-humiliation 
principles and anti-subordination principles that Yoshino has found elsewhere in gay rights 
cases.  In addition, the signature of this definition of immutability is compatible with the animus-
dignity narrative of sexual orientation discrimination that has been used in gay rights cases to 
show how governmental interference on the basis of sexual orientation has led to discrimination 
that demeans the individual.   Indeed the contour of the definition has anti-stereotyping potential 
and pairing it with the animus-dignity connection would underscore the relevance and 
appropriateness of this immutability definition over the previous one.     
If animus and dignity concepts paired together with the newer interpretation of 
immutability, then this coupling would be another instance where dignity could be recalibrated 
as respect rather than respectability.  Dignity as respect could place this definition of 
immutability in the tradition of Lawrence as far as elevating gay rights and support casting 
sexual orientation under a broader immutability theory.  Incidentally, it would also not be 
inconsistent with Obergefell’s passing mention of immutability; in fact, it could further augment 
Kennedy’s definition in the opinion when he incidentally mentioned that the “immutable nature” 
of same-sex couples mandated the extension of the right to marriage273 or that “sexual orientation 
is both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”274  Along that vein, the 
associations of dignity as respect within the immutability discussion would reify respect politics 
and at the same time make case for the immutability of sexual orientation to help gain ground 
eventually for heighten scrutiny.  Immutability, above other factors, has been one that has most 
often prevented a finding of suspect classification.  In other words, what dignity as respect would 
admit and reveal what this Article has tried to demonstrate with respect rhetoric is that that 
sexual identity is innate as part of human existence.  From here, that mediating effect in animus 
and dignity concepts recalibrated toward respect could potentially broaden the immutability 
factor for building up a suspect or quasi-suspect classification for sexual orientation under equal 
protection.   
And suspect classification doctrinally minds that gap between Obergefell and anti-
discrimination advances for sexual orientation.  In this method, pairing dignity as respect with 
immutability might advance anti-discrimination as it clarifies immutability but also aligns it with 
anti-discrimination politics.  If equal protection finally recognizes sexual orientation under a 
protected classification, not only does it enhance protections for sexual minorities under the 14th 
amendment but it presents the leveraging opportunities for anti-discrimination outside the 
judiciary; such recognition also presses for majoritarian clarification for protection under 
legislation, such as Title VII.  Anti-discrimination protects immutable traits.275  The purpose of 
immutability is to help clarify that the trait in question is one in which discrimination has been 
                                                 
272 Michael Boucai, supra note __, at 471 (“As the term’s originator recognized, the new immutability, like 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence, is ultimately about individual “self-determination” in the domain of 
sexuality.”) (citations omitted). 
273 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.  
274 Id. at 2596. 
275 Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 439, 476-77 (2010).   
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premised upon and one that should not continue to be premised upon.276  Therefore, pairing the 
newer definition of immutability with a recalibrated animus-dignity connection that reflects 
respect politics could convince courts of the adoption of the newer immutability definition and in 
turn obtain heightened scrutiny for gays.  In the long run, such advances bode well for legislative 
developments in anti-discrimination, as well as preserve a more effective use of dignity as 
respect.  All of this supports dignity as a respect as the normative rather than dignity as 
respectability.  Eventually, if the courts are beginning to elevate protections for sexual minorities 
by respecting their sexual identities, then there is pressure to do the same on the legislative end.  
Hopefully, the legislatures will then follow suit.       
V. CONCLUSION 
Indeed, as this Article has shown, the movement in gay rights advocacy must continue to 
persist for stronger anti-discrimination protections this era after marriage equality.  Sexual 
minorities have arrived at significant successes of late, but their cultural acceptance is enveloped 
within a politics of respectability that is incompatible with normative positions on dignity within 
American constitutional law.  Instead, that politics of respectability restricts the visibility of 
sexual minorities and leaves them within a paradigm that supports a hierarchy of norms and 
values antithetical, as we have seen here, to formal equality and anti-discrimination.  Progressing 
to the meat of things invariably means that we must move quickly beyond soup. 
To reverse the trend, dignity will have to be recalibrated to reflect inherent respect toward 
sexual identities—in litigation and in ways in which we view substantive rights and equality.  
Otherwise, minority sexual identities will continue to be subordinated post-Obergefell—only this 
time in deceptively smaller but no less discourteous ways.  Consequently, rather than finding out 
what sexuality means to the dominant culture and allowing the mainstream to define its approach 
to sexual identity, dignity as respect helps us get closer to allowing sexual minorities to have an 
equal footing.  Respect, and not respectability, would better facilitate the equality that would 
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